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Alberto Chong and Florencio López-De-Silanes

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Alberto Chong, Inter-American Development Bank Florencio López-De-Silanes, Yale University and NBER

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Summary

Critics of privatization argue that poor labor force restructuring is a key concern and that governments should establish better retrenchment programs. Using new data from a random sample of 400 companies in the world, we test competing theories about the wisdom of retrenchment programs and their effect on prices paid by buyers and rehiring policies by private owners after privatization. Our results show that adverse selection plagues retrenchment programs carried out by governments before privatization. Controlling for endogeneity, several labor retrenchment policies yield a negative impact on net privatization prices. In confirmation of the adverse selection argument, various types of voluntary downsizing lead to a higher probability of rehiring the same workers by the new private owners. Compulsory skill-based programs are the only type of program that is marginally associated with higher prices and lower rehiring rates after privatization, but the political and economic costs of this policy may make it somewhat unpractical. A qualified 'do not intervene' appears to be the safest bet in labor retrenchment before privatization.

Keywords: Privatization, downsizing, adverse selection, corporate governance

JEL: G32, H10, J45, O1

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Address for correspondence:

Alberto Chong Inter-American Development Bank 1300 New York Avenue Washington DC 20577 USA Phone: 202-623-1536 Fax: 202-623-2481 E-mail: ALBERTOCH@iadb.org

PRIVATIZATION AND LABOR FORCE RESTRUCTURING AROUND THE WORLD

1. INTRODUCTION

In the last two decades many countries have embarked on major privatization programs, but there are still several countries that have been reluctant to privatize. This is particularly true in developing countries, as reflected by the fact that state-owned enterprises in these countries still account for more than ten percent of gross domestic product, twenty percent of investment, and about five percent of formal employment (Kikeri, 1999). While there is growing evidence of the benefits of privatization (for example Megginson 1994, Ia Porta and López-de-Silanes 1999), the unwillingness to privatize appears to be associated with a rather negative perception of the privatization process with respect to the labor force. Critics argue that poor labor force restructuring is a key concern and that governments should establish better retrenchment programs.

On the other hand, opponents of the government's restructuring of to-beprivatized firms argue that public unions can influence the future of politicians, effectively reducing the government's bargaining power (Freeman 1996, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1997). It has also been argued that it is not worth spending resources in restructuring the labor force before privatization, as governments may not be able to distinguish the particular workers that should be retained (Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999; Rama, 1999). Governments that administer human resources risk retrenching the wrong, more productive personnel. This may result in the loss of know-how that, at a minimum, may help solve short-run post-privatization efficiency problems and, at worst may be linked with permanent damage to the productive structure of the firm. Dismissing the workers that the new owners would rather keep may not add value to the firm and consequently may reduce privatization prices. This is particularly true in developing countries where available information is even more lacking (Rama, 1999).

Although labor restructuring is one of the most difficult and sensitive issues in privatization, the empirical literature available is quite scarce as a result of the lack of data to address these issues. Our paper contributes to this literature in three ways: by creating a new cross-country database with detailed information about labor retrenchment policies before privatization and labor rehiring efforts after the firms go into private hands; by documenting the effects of different labor restructuring policies on the net privatization prices paid by buyers; and by analyzing worker rehiring in privatized firms that were subjected to various types of retrenchment programs.

The paper pays particular attention to the quality of various targeting processes. In fact, not all targeting are created equal. From an empirical perspective, it may well be the case that a state-owned enterprise that uses targeting when restructuring labor prior to privatization may be able to fetch a higher privatization price by applying a targeting mechanism that may prove very costly afterwards. An example may be the case of agebiased retrenchment, where retrenchment is targeted on older and typically more expensive workers. Although privatization prices may be thought to increase as a result of this policy, as the future operation costs of the firm are expected to improve, the net impact on future efficiency is unclear as some of these workers may also have been the more productive, experienced or better trained.

Unlike the previous literature, which focused on the effects of restructuring on prices for the case of Mexico (López-de-Silanes 1997), the nature of our data allows us to look at two complementary slices of the picture before and after privatization across countries. We are able to analyze the impact of a large set of labor policies before privatization, and observe if the private firms' reaction in terms of rehiring of the previously fired workers. Our analysis uses these two types of results to provide an evaluation of the price effect of labor restructuring policies and the managerial quality of the downsizing efforts carried out by the government before privatization.

The database was constructed by randomly selecting 400 firms privatized between 1982-2000 around the world. We obtained pre and post privatization data by sending a detailed questionnaire to the CEO of the privatized firm and accessing privatization files. We followed up with each of the firms and corroborated their answers with several public sources and data for these firms coming from international financial agencies and privatization ministries. The result is a comprehensive cross-country database with firm characteristics, detailed labor restructuring policies before privatization, and labor rehiring policies after the firm entered the private sphere.¹

The basic thrust of our results is that adverse selection plagues retrenchment programs carried out by governments before privatization. Controlling for endogeneity, labor downsizing does not do much in terms of net privatization prices.² This finding may appear somewhat counterintuitive, as, according to the conventional wisdom, sellers will always want the government to downsize prior to privatization. However, this is fairly consistent with the political view on prior restructuring before privatization (López-de-Silanes 1997). Results also show that once controlling for endogeneity, pay cuts do not

¹ An additional benefit of this data is that it allows us to consider the issue of failed privatizations on prices, rarely treated in the literature. Research on privatization implicitly sets aside failed privatizations since data is typically available only for companies that actually attract bidders. This potentially underestimates the impact of labor changes for these companies are likely the ones that went through more thorough restructuring efforts prior to privatization. Methodologically, this issue is addressed by using a simple non-linear procedure for the entire, truncated, distribution of privatization prices.

² As defined by the amount that accrues to the government after all costs are taken into account, adjusted by shares sold and divided by average sales during the three years prior to privatization.

increase prices while employment guarantee programs forced to the buyer do carry a significant discount in prices.

To further study the results in the area of downsizing, we focus on the nature of the retrenchment process prior to privatization and its impact on rehiring. Confirming the adverse selection argument, several kinds of voluntary downsizing lead to a higher frequency of rehiring of the same workers by the new private owners.

The only exception is compulsory skill-biased programs as they are marginally associated with higher prices and lower rehiring rates after privatization in some specifications. One could argue that the nature of the program itself, typically based on written exams or panel reviews, may partly explain these results. Unfortunately, this policy is one of the most politically difficult to implement by the government and requires a tough stance from the authority. Results show that the managerial quality of the government may have an impact in the results, but as a general policy it appears that not much time and effort should be spent on labor restructuring before privatization.

The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data collection process and discusses the empirical methodology. In section 3, we test whether labor restructuring has an impact on privatization prices and whether such results hold when failed privatization and or potential endogeneity are taken into account. Section 4 extends our results on prices for specific types of downsizing measures. Section 5 provides a new look at the effect on prior downsizing by the government by analyzing the nature of post-privatization re-hires by private owners. Finally, Section 6 concludes.

2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Our sample was formed based on a list compiled by the authors of about 1500 privatizations around the world covering the period 1982-2000.³ The two main sources for this list are the World Bank Privatization database and Privatisation International, which together arguably provide the largest source of privatization transactions in the world. From this original list, we selected a random sample of 400 big and small firms to whom we sent a detailed questionnaire designed by the authors. The questionnaire was addressed to the CEO with a recommendation to direct it to the chief financial officer and the director of human resources of the firm.⁴

In order to ensure the quality of our data, we employed four additional sources. First, we took advantage of the fact that in several developing countries many privatizations have been performed as part of structural adjustment or other lending programs with the support of the World Bank. We were able to access a wide range of World Bank's internal documents to double check and in some instances, complement the information collected in our survey. In particular, we made extensive use of the World Bank's electronic Intranet system called *ImageBank*, which allows full access to such documents⁵. Second, we also made broad use of *NEXIS* to search for a number of national and international publications.⁶ Third, whenever possible we interviewed

³ We excluded voucher privatizations. As it has been discussed elsewhere, there are fundamental differences between such privatization technique and others, which would have made comparisons particularly difficult (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994).

⁴ While directors of human resources answered 71.4 percent of the labor part of the questionnaires, public relations managers answered 16.6 percent of them. Personnel working at human resources departments other than managers answered about 5.5 percent, and personnel working at public relations answered 6.5 percent usually on behalf of managers. Financial information was typically provided by the office of the chief financial officer or, in the case of small firms, by the office of the CEO.

⁵ Typical World Bank documents include Country Economic Reports, Staff Appraisal Reports, President's Reports, Supervision documents, Project Completion Reports, Audit Reports, Operation Evaluation Studies, and Sector Reports. We covered about 63.4 percent of the sample.

⁶ To do this, we mainly employed the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, Oxford Analytica, and the Economist Intelligence Unit. We covered around 70.1 percent of the sample.

officials from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American Development Bank that were directly associated with the privatization programs in different countries.⁷ Finally, when necessary, we directly contacted the privatization offices or corresponding ministries (e.g., finance, industry) of each country to request specific pre-privatization information missing⁸. Whenever we found discrepancies we contacted again the national privatization agencies and the firms themselves to clarify the issues.⁹

We organized the questionnaire in four areas. The first area covered, preprivatization firm characteristics, and asked about sales, assets, profits, liabilities, management changes, sector of origin. The second area covered pre-privatization labor characteristics and policies, and asked about number of blue and white collar workers, presence and incidence of unions, number of strikes, political affiliation of unions, labor restructuring measures and targets. The third area focused on the privatization process, and in particular, on privatization prices, transaction methods used, shares sold, and foreign participation. Finally, the fourth area included post-privatization labor re-hiring policies. We tried to get both dummy variables and exact number of workers for every possible category. However, we were not able to achieve this, as most respondents did not provide enough numerical information about the workers involved in various retrenchment and rehiring programs, so we settled for dummy variables that tell us if the

⁷ We also specifically selected firms totaling about 15 percent of the total sample and double or triple -check most of the information.

⁸ Using this approach we covered 73.2 percent of the sample.

⁹ We found most discrepancies in developing countries, in particular Africa and the Middle East. Whenever data led to significant discrepancies that could not be reconciled the firms were eliminated from the sample. This occurred in 6 cases in total, 4 from Africa, 1 from the Middle East, 1 from Asia. These firms were classified under the category "firms that supplied incomplete information" in Table 2.

policies were undertaken or not.¹⁰ Table 1 provides definitions of the specific variables that we collected.

Table 2 shows the results of our efforts to gather data. Out of the 400 cases targeted we ended up collecting data for 308 privatizations comprising 85 countries for the period 1982-2000. Of those, 16 are failed privatizations or operations in which preparation for privatization occurred but in which the sale ended up not materializing. As the table indicates, the complete information for our 308 firms accounts for 97.21 percent of total sales. On the other hand, 25 companies comprising about one percent of total sales supplied quite incomplete information that could not be further completed and thus, ended up not being used. Additionally, 26 firms did not respond to our requests, denied the existence of information, or simply refused to provide it. Twenty-two firms, accounting for 0.78 percent of total sales, could not be included since they were liquidated and no longer exist. Finally, nineteen firms could not be included in our sample as they merged and no longer keep separate accounting and financial statements. The pattern in our resulting sample in terms of both, region, year of privatization, and sector fits closely with the compiled list of privatizations of Privatisation International and the World Bank, particularly, when excluding voucher privatizations. This leads us to reasonably conclude that our sample is unbiased.

Figure 1 shows the distribution of our sample by region of the world with respect to the pattern found in the original privatization lists. Whereas 33 percent of the privatizations in our sample are from Latin America, 8 percent from Asia, 21 percent from Africa and the Middle East, 25 percent from developed countries, and 13 percent from Transition Economies, the corresponding percentages for the original list are 30

¹⁰ In fact, only 26.3 percent of respondents provided some numerical information.

percent, 10 percent, 20 percent, 23 percent, and 18 percent, respectively. Similarly, Figure 2 compares the distribution of privatizations in our sample and the original list of privatizations. In both cases, the bulk of privatizations are between the mid-nineties and late nineties, where more than half of operations in our sample were carried out. Finally, Figure 3 compares the distribution of privatizations by broad sector category and, as before, the resulting pattern is remarkably similar in both cases.¹¹

Table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables used in this paper. The set of variables is organized according to firm attributes, privatization characteristics, labor characteristics, labor restructuring policies, and some basic post-privatization hiring measures. Along the lines of López-de-Silanes (1997) the net privatization price is defined as the amount that accrues to the government after all privatization and restructuring costs are taken into account, such as government commitments at the time of sale, and other adjustments are made to the sale contract. This number is adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold and divided by the average net sales during the three years prior to privatization. The present value of the resulting number as of December 2000 is the dependent variable employed which is labeled "Net Privatization Price / Sales.¹²

The labor-downsizing variable may be viewed as a basic summary measure of labor restructuring, as it is typically the most widely employed and most relevant from a policy perspective. This variable is defined as a dummy variable that equals one if the

¹¹ The World Bank privatization data, which are for developing and transition economies, only also has information on number of shares sold and foreign participation. When we compare our developing country sub-sample (231 observations) to the one from the World Bank we also find a very consistent pattern between both databases.

¹² López de Silanes (1997) also uses the firms' total assets and total liabilities to develop a so-called *Privatization Q*. In our case, such variable was not possible to construct. However, as a rough proxy in our regressions we include a dummy variable that equals one when total liabilities are greater than total assets (see Table 1 for variable definition).

firm undertook any reduction in the labor force up to three years prior to privatization, and zero otherwise. We follow Haltiwanger and Singh (1999) and classify this variable by type, as voluntary and compulsory, and by targeting nature, as age-biased, skill-biased, and female-biased downsizing. Table 4 provides a breakdown of our sample along these lines. Voluntary downsizing is defined as any kind of non-compulsory labor downsizing where the worker chooses to leave, typically as a result of a monetary or non-monetary severance compensation package by the firm. Monetary packages are usually given as a function of two variables, wage and seniority. Typically, the older the worker and the higher the current wage the larger the severance package¹³. Pension enhancements and similar benefits may also be included under this category. Non-monetary packages include any type of in-kind payment that range from training to any other similar enhancements to the safety net intended to help workers that leave, such as food and clothes¹⁴.

The type of targeting employed, if any, is another useful classification of labor downsizing. As mentioned above, three are considered in this paper: age-biased downsizing, skill-biased downsizing, and gender-biased downsizing. Age-biased downsizing includes any labor cut that used age as a reference for such cut. This type of downsizing may be applied in the context of voluntary or involuntary downsizing programs. In fact, while voluntary age-biased downsizing is found in nearly 34 percent of total downsizing cases (and 82 percent of total voluntary cases), this kind of downsizing is not limited to choice as it may be implemented by force, too. In fact, one-half of all the involuntary downsizing cases are age-biased. This is shown in Table 4. The most

¹³ Recent research proposes using compensation schemes based on additional characteristics of the individual or her household (such as education, gender, and others) and not just wage and seniority (Rama, 1999; Chong and Rama, 1999).

common age-biased downsizing programs are voluntary early retirement programs through pension enhancements, which, as it implies, target older workers¹⁵. Mandatory retirement of a specific group of older workers is relatively common in developing countries, too.

Skill-biased downsizing includes any labor cut that uses any written or oral method, test, interview, or certification to measure skills or occupational ability as a retrenchment reference. Thus, skill-biased programs restrict the program along detailed occupational or skill groupings (Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999). A typical example is to test workers on general or particular labor skills in order to decide whether or not to keep them. In recent years, the classic example of this is the Peruvian Tax Administration in the early nineties, which required all workers to pass a written test for workers to keep their jobs. Those workers that did not pass were fired and the new potential workers brought replace the old ones also had to pass a written exam. As a consequence of this, turnover in the Tax Agency reached about 30 percent. Another example is the case of the Central Bank of Ecuador. After a disastrous attempt to downsize using voluntary programs, the Central Bank decided to classify all its personnel in three categories: those that were essential for its functioning, those that were clearly redundant, and those for whom it was difficult to tell. This classification was based on the nature of the worker's unit and on the worker's occupation and educational attainment. Essential workers did not have an option to leave (they were "ring fenced"), redundant workers did not have the option to stay, and the rest were offered a voluntary separation program (Rama and MacIsaac, 1999).

¹⁴ This last is not uncommon in African countries.

¹⁵ This program typically improves pension benefits if the worker retires earlier than the legal or agreed upon age. It has been applied widely in developing and developed countries.

Gender-biased retrenchment refers to labor cuts based on any implicit or explicit gender-based indicators. Practically all gender-biased retrenchment is female biased. Since most developed countries have laws against gender discrimination and in both, developing and developed countries such bias is, at least explicitly, considered ethically wrong, we expect this variable to bias downwards. Finally, neutral downsizing refers to any labor cuts that did not include any of the three target groups above. Though in theory a firm may apply one, two, or more targeted downsizing mechanisms at the same time, interestingly, the overlap of retrenchment policies is relatively small in the case of our sample of firms, as 87 percent of firms did not apply more than one single mechanism. On the other hand, less than one percent of firms in our sample applied skill, age, and female biased retrenchment when downsizing at the same time. This is also shown in Table 4¹⁶.

Roughly 78 percent of our sample of firms did some labor force downsizing, most of it compulsory, as shown in Table 5^{17} . Such percentage is similar when looking at regions¹⁸. However, the data show great variation in the labor cuts before privatization both in terms of their nature as well as across regions. For instance, age-biased downsizing was the more predominant in our sample, with 49 percent of firms using it. On the other hand, skill-biased retrenchment is used by only 13 percent of state-owned enterprises worldwide, mostly by developed countries with 15 percent. Additionally, Table 5 also includes two other labor restructuring policies, employment guarantees (after

¹⁶ Also, while voluntary and compulsory downsizing may have been used simultaneously, as the example in the Central Bank of Ecuador above shows, this was an extremely uncommon occurrence according to our sample. In the three instances where this occurred we treated one as two separate episodes, and in the others we chose the predominant downsizing method.

¹⁷ This percentage is strikingly similar to the one found by Haltiwanger and Singh (1999) for 41 retrenchment programs in 37 countries using a mainly civil sector sample. They also find that compulsory downsizing is as predominant as voluntary downsizing (46 percent in our sample).

privatization) and pay cuts (prior to privatization). These are dummy variables that capture whether a specific firm proceeded with the mentioned policy in any of the three years that preceded privatization and, as their names indicate, their interpretation is straightforward.

Table 6 provides some simple correlation of our labor downsizing measures. Two things stand out. First, the general downsizing measure is, as expected, correlated with its components, in particular, voluntary downsizing. Second, the voluntary downsizing measure is significantly correlated with age-biased downsizing, as it is frequent to find early retirement programs as a downsizing mechanism. However, other than that, there is little significant correlation among downsizing measures.

Table 7 provides a first analysis of the data. We divide the sample into two groups according to whether any labor restructuring did or did not take place in a state-owned enterprise. The table shows the value of the mean and median of the share adjusted net privatization prices of the firms, the difference in net price means and medians, and the t-statistic and z-statistics associated with such difference in means and medians, respectively. Most labor restructuring policies yield statistically significant differences in means and medians. Interestingly, this finding does not provide support to the idea that governments should pursue labor restructuring, quite the opposite. Governments that restructured labor in state-owned enterprises before privatization obtained significantly lower privatization prices in relation with those that did not restructure labor. In particular, governments received *lower* revenues as a result of labor force downsizing, the key measure. This finding, however, does not consider that other prior restructuring policies may be playing a role, and in particular, do not take into account endogeneity

¹⁸ In Latin America, Africa, and Industrial Countries, 82 percent, 79 percent, and 79 percent of the firms

problems. In fact, it may be argued that the firms that downsize are the ones that need to do so as they are the worst performers. According to these results, only labor restructuring through pay cuts yield increased prices, and even in this case the difference in means is only weakly statistically significant.

3. DOWNSIZING AND PRIVATIZATION PRICES

In this section we present regression analysis on the link between labor restructuring policies and privatization prices. Net privatization prices are regressed against a set of variables that has been classified in four groups. The first is firm and privatization characteristics. We use a dummy that equals one when net total liabilities are greater than zero for the average of the three years prior to privatization. Similarly, we include a set of dummy variables to take into account for economic sector¹⁹. We also include the percentage of shares sold, a variable that takes into account whether foreign participation was allowed, as well the type of privatization sale, in particular, public offerings and direct sales. The second group includes firm labor characteristics, as reflected by the presence of unions and the existence of strikes and related physical protests on the last three years before privatization. The third group reflects laborrestructuring policies applied prior to privatization, namely, employment guarantees, pay cuts, and labor cuts, including whether such downsizing was compulsory or voluntary, and whether there are any skills, age, or gender bias in the labor downsizing operation.

did some labor force downsizing, respectively. ¹⁹ These dummies are not reported in the regressions. We considered the following economic sectors: (i) mining (metallic minerals and nonmetallic minerals); (ii) manufacturing (canned fish and seafood; sugar mills; tobacco products; beverages; textiles, clothing, and leather; wood; paper and printing; heavy machinery; transportation equipment); (iii) services (hotels and restaurants; land and sea transportation; communications; and recreation); (iv) others (land; unclassified firms)

Finally, the last group includes country-specific macroeconomic variables, in particular, the gross domestic product, and the rate of inflation²⁰.

The first column in Table 9 presents our basic results. We first use a simple ordinary least squares approach and assume that labor-restructuring policies are exogenous. In this case, sixteen observations are excluded from our sample as they represent failed operations, that is, privatizations of state-owned enterprises that for one reason or another did not find a buyer and consequently have no privatization price. With respect to the first group of variables, firm and privatization characteristics, we find, as expected, a negative and statistical significant coefficient in the case net liabilities. The result suggests that when net total liabilities are present, the privatization price decrease by 31 percent (López-de-Silanes, 1997). We also find that the coefficient of the share of the firm that was privatized yields a negative and statistically significant link with privatization prices. This result suggests that an additional 10 percent of privatized share decreases privatization price by 3 percent. Additionally, foreign participation yields a positive and statistically significant sign at one percent. This result suggests that allowing foreign participation is associated with a 32 percent increase in privatization prices. Public offerings yield positive and statistically significant sign and are associated with a 19 percent increase in privatization price. Direct sales yield a negative and statistically non-significant sign (Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997; López-de-Silanes, 1997).

With respect to labor characteristics we find that the presence of unions up to three years prior to privatization is associated with a privatization price 25 percent lower, as the sign of the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at one percent.

²⁰ Since the country-specific macroeconomic variables do capture any specific variation among countries in our sample, country dummies are excluded when using them and vice-versa. Results do not change. Also, other macroeconomic variables were considered and results are very similar.

Similarly, we also find that the strikes and other forms of physical protest are negatively linked with privatization prices though it is not statistically significant²¹. These findings are similar to the ones by López-de-Silanes (1997) for the case of Mexico²².

When focusing on the set of labor policy variables, our key set of interest, we find that the downsizing summary measure is associated with a privatization price 8 percent lower, as the sign of the coefficient is negative and statistically significant at five percent. Again this under the assumption of exogeneity and when excluding failed privatizations. Similarly, we find that using employment guarantees prior to privatization is linked with a privatization price 16 percent lower, as the corresponding sign is negative and statistically significant at one percent. If maximizing revenues is the sole objective of policymakers, applying this kind of policy contradicts such an objective²³. On the other hand, pay cuts prior to privatization yield a negative sign that is not statistically significant.

The second column in Table 9 provides results when failed privatizations, but not endogeneity, are taken into account. As mentioned above, we use tobits (censored below at zero) to include observations from failed privatizations that may or may not have restructured the labor force. Our findings using this technique to account for failed privatizations are very similar to our previous results. Focusing on the labor variables, we find that unions is associated with a privatization price 25 percent lower, as the sign of

²¹ Since unions and strikes are relatively highly correlated it is not a surprise that the latter yields a statistically non-significant coefficient. When excluding the unions variable or constructing a combined "unions-strikes" variable the signs are negative and statistically significant at one percent.

²² They are consistent with the *political view* of labor restructuring by which unions may try to block privatizations which are costly to buyers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1996).

²³ However, governments frequently have more than one, frequently contradictory, objectives. The value of this finding from a policy perspective is, perhaps, to make policymakers aware that there appears to be a trade-off between objectives and their cost.

the corresponding coefficient is negative and statistically significant at one percent. Similarly, we find that the strikes variable is negative but statistically not significant. Furthermore, the downsizing variable is associated with a 12 percent decrease in privatization prices, as the sign of coefficient is negative and statistically significant at five percent. Finally, employment guarantees is associated with a privatization price 18 percent lower, and pay cut while negative is, again, statistically non-significant. In general, the results provided so far support the idea that labor force restructuring, and more importantly, labor retrenchment *decrease* privatization prices.

A problem with the empirical results above are, however, that they do not take into account potential endogeneity issues. This may arise as governments try to restructure the labor force of the state-owned enterprises before the sale in order to raise the privatization price. The negative sign may be simply a reflection that the firms in worse shape are shedding labor. For instance, if the unobservable characteristics of a firm are positively correlated with the presence of strong unions, the government may be particularly interested in dismantle such union. Using a method by López-de-Silanes (1997) we apply a two-step instrumental variables approach by estimating a non-linear reduced-form equation that describes the probability that a particular labor restructuring policy may be implemented²⁴. The instruments used are classified in two groups, macroeconomic-level determinants and firm-level determinants. The macroeconomic variables considered are: the average growth rate in the three years prior to privatization, the average unemployment rate three years prior to privatization, the average fiscal deficits over gross domestic product three years prior to privatization, the size of the

²⁴ These variables are *excluded instruments*, as they are not included in the privatization price equation. This instruments have very low statistical power when included directly in the price equation, but they are

public sector, openness, law origin, and continental dummies. The firm-level variables included are a dummy variable to reflect whether the firm had profits greater than zero in any of the three years prior to privatization, the presence of a leading agent bank in the country, management change, political affiliation of unions, and sector variables. In general, these variables correspond with the variables employed in López-de-Silanes (1997). As required in this procedure, none of these variables is statistically significant when included in the price equation. Also the F-statistic for the excluded instruments is statistically significant at 1 percent. Appendix 1 shows the first stage probit for the case of the key labor downsizing summary measure²⁵. The set of instruments used for each labor-restructuring variable is shown in Table 8.

The third and fourth columns in Table 9 present our findings when correcting for endogeneity using the method above. The former excludes failed privatizations, while the latter includes them²⁶. The results for privatization and firm characteristics are, essentially, identical to the non-instrumented results above. Furthermore, our findings for labor characteristics are also very similar to before as we find that the presence of unions is associated with a privatization price 25 percent lower. With respect to our key group of variables of interest, labor policies, we find that employment guarantees is negatively linked with net privatization prices, and is statistically significant. However, we find that when controlling for endogeneity, neither pay cut, nor downsizing appears to significantly change privatization prices. That is, while the conventional wisdom has it

highly correlated with the labor restructuring actions of the firm, as shown by applying F-statistics to test for the joint hypothesis that they are all equal to zero (Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997).²⁵ Because of space considerations, the first stage for all the other labor restructuring measures and for the

²³ Because of space considerations, the first stage for all the other labor restructuring measures and for the firm labor conditions are not presented. We would be happy to provide them upon request.

²⁶ All the coefficients of economic sectors have positive signs and are not statistically significant in the ordinary least square regression. However, they become statistically significant at ten percent when including failed privatizations.

that prospective buyers will prefer governments to get rid of labor before privatization, our results so far show that such may not be the most adequate $policy^{27}$.

4. VOLUNTARY AND TARGETED DOWNSIZING AND ADVERSE SELECTION

Governments frequently intervene in the labor downsizing process by using voluntary downsizing schemes as well as skills, age, or gender benchmarks. The inclusion of voluntary schemes is shown in columns 5-8 in Table 9. In fact, voluntary downsizing schemes usually account for a very large percentage of total labor downsizing $(Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999)^{28}$. The reason for their popularity is simple. Such schemes are politically non-costly, are attractive to workers and thus, by-pass the power of unions, and can be relatively easily designed and administered by governments (Rama; 1999, Jeon and Laffont, 1999). We find that regardless of the econometric method and inclusion of failed privatizations, this variable yields a negative and statistically significant sign²⁹. In fact, our results suggest that voluntary downsizing is associated with about a 12 percent decrease in privatization prices. Interestingly, this negative link may be a reflection of adverse selection, as workers with the best outside prospects may have left and those with the worst outside perspectives may have stayed. The human capital of the firm may have deteriorated and thus, the privatization price may reflect so. In fact, a loss of know-how associated with short-run post-privatization efficiency problems may have occurred and, at an extreme this may be linked with permanent damage to the productive structure of the firm. Consequently, getting rid of workers the new owners

²⁷ These results are actually similar to those by Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) regarding labor restructuring in Mexico. In fact, he finds that labor cuts yield a negative sign at ten percent statistical significance when not controlling for endogeneity, and a positive sign also at ten percent statistically significance. Both results are not robust.

²⁸ In our sample, for instance, voluntary downsizing accounts for about 41 percent of total downsizing as shown in Table 5. ²⁹ The statistical significance ranges from one percent in the simple ordinary least squares case, to ten

percent in the tobit instrumental variables case.

would rather keep may not add value to the firm and may reduce privatization prices. In other words, despite the fact that voluntary separation programs are politically palatable and thus, attractive to policymakers, the findings here show that, as predicted by theory (Kahn, 1985; Diwan, 1994; Jeon and Laffont, 1999), such downsizing mechanisms do not help governments adequately identify those workers that are less productive. In fact, governments will tend to separate the wrong workers from their jobs possibly at an excessively high cost (Haltiwanger and Singh, 1999; Rama, 1999).

Governments also try to manage the downsizing process by focusing on three downsizing categories that are particularly predominant: age-biased, skill-biased, and female-biased downsizing. As described in the data section, age-biased retrenchment focuses on age as the deciding variable, skill-biased downsizing usually focus on workers along measures of skills, for instance, written tests, and female-biased downsizing focuses on gender as the critical retrenchment factor. Table 10 shows our findings using these measures. Controlling for endogeneity we find that downsizing using age as a benchmark results in a decrease of around 10 percent in privatization prices as the sign of the corresponding coefficients are negative and statistically significant at one percent (columns 3 and 4). On the other hand, our findings suggest that downsizing using skills is barely positively significant with respect to privatization prices when controlling for endogeneity (columns 3 and 4 in Table 10) ³⁰. According to this finding, using skills as a benchmark indicator may increase prices by 22 percent. When controlling for

³⁰ In the case of age-biased downsizing, ordinary least squares coefficients are statistically significant at one percent (columns 1 and 2). In the case of administered downsizing by skills, ordinary least squares yield similar signs as in the instrumental variables methods, but the coefficients are not statistically significant in the former. As we argue above, and as Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) shows, endogeneity is a problem.

endogeneity, the female bias variable is negative but statistically non-significant³¹. The results above further suggest that adverse selection may be an issue in downsizing programs prior to privatization as both voluntary downsizing and age-biased downsizing appear to reduce privatization prices. As explained above, those workers that are dismissed using these methods are not necessarily the least productive or the least skilled as an inadequate identification of workers may have taken place. Furthermore, the fact that skill-biased downsizing yields a positive, though marginally statistically significant link with respect to privatization prices appears to provide some corroborating evidence along these lines, especially if one believes that skills are correlated with productivity³².

Classifying targeted downsizing as voluntary or compulsory may provide further analysis. In fact, doing this yields two additional categories, voluntary-targeted downsizing and compulsory-targeted downsizing. Furthermore, as before, voluntary or compulsory targeted downsizing may be age-biased, skilled-biased or female-biased driven which results in three voluntary targeted downsizing categories and three compulsory targeted downsizing categories (see Table 4). Voluntary targeted results are shown in Table 11. The classic example of voluntary age-biased downsizing is early retirement programs³³. As this table shows, voluntary age-biased downsizing is negative and statistically significant at one percent when using the non-instrumented method, and negative and statistically significant at five percent in the two-step procedure. This result

³¹ In fact, this variable is never statistically significant and does change signs depending on the methodology employed. People admitting to gender bias were few. This is clearly not surprising, as people may not be truthful for fear of retaliation. Also, legal and particular society considerations may be at issue. ³² In fact, the link between education and productivity is widely accepted in the economics of education literature.

³³ In the skill-biased category finding a 'clean' example is somewhat more difficult. After all, who would want to take a voluntary test when she will know it may be used to fire her? Somewhat like the Fifth Amendment though, where, for all practical purposes taking it is frequently associated with a presumption of guilt, not taking a "suggested" exam may expose the worker to retaliation. While one may argue that this

appears to further confirm the idea that adverse selection is a problem when applying administered or targeted downsizing in the public sector as older workers are not necessarily the least productive ones, and the best older workers may have higher incentives to leave first. Moreover, similar to the case above, the voluntary skill-biased downsizing variable is positive but it is statistically non-significant³⁴. In short, the findings in this table appear to further suggest that the negative link between downsizing and privatization prices is related to the fact that the labor downsizing before privatization was inadequately done. On the other hand, Table 12 shows our findings when using compulsory targeted variables. As the name implies, in this category there is no choice element by worker. Firms simply choose the workers that will stay and those that will leave using age (for example, older workers), skills (for example, when managers in each division choose the most skilled ones), or gender, as a retrenchment reference. Though the signs in the compulsory age-biased variable and compulsory skillbiased variable are similar to our previous results, the age coefficient, unlike the voluntary targeted case, is now statistically non-significant. That is, in this case there is no impact on privatization prices. This result is consistent with the fact that voluntary programs are theoretically expected to produce somewhat larger adverse selection problems than compulsory ones (Jeon and Laffont, 1999; Anat and Levy, 1997; Kahn, 1985). In fact, while in voluntary age-biased programs it may be expected that the more productive workers may leave rather than the more unproductive ones, in mass compulsory programs it is reasonable to expect that both the good and the bad will leave. The net effect will tend to cancel out. On the other hand, in the case of the compulsory

mechanism is not really voluntary, from the perspective of firms, ministries, and privatization agencies – from whom we mainly got the data from the explicit method is clearly understood as voluntary.

skill-biased downsizing variable we find that the corresponding coefficient yields a positive and marginally statistically significant coefficient in the two-step Tobit procedure that includes failed privatizations, only. It appears that compulsory exams, as a relatively good objective measure of productivity, may help keep the more productive workers, which is reflected in an increase in privatization prices. From a practical perspective, however, this policy prescription is highly controversial, as its applicability will clearly depend on the political climate of the country³⁵.

In summary, so far we have found that when controlling for endogeneity, labor retrenchment and pay cuts do not have any bearing on net privatization prices. Employment guarantee programs affect prices negatively as their imposition lower the privatization prices by 16 percent, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, our results show that, if anything, targeted labor downsizing appears to produce a selection of the wrong group of workers, possibly the less productive ones, reflected in the fact that voluntary and agebiased downsizing reduce net privatization prices between 10 and 15 percent, ceteris paribus. This is further suggested by the fact that voluntary age-biased retrenchment appears to be the driving force behind the negative link between voluntary downsizing and prices. In fact, unlike compulsory age-biased retrenchment, which, as expected, yields no statistical significance, the coefficient of the voluntary one is negative and statistically significant, which suggests that there may be incentives for the most productive older workers to leave first. Moreover, the fact that compulsory skill-biased

 ³⁴ High correlation with the voluntary age-biased variable may be a problem, as 14 out of the 20 observations that are positive are also voluntary age-biased (Table 4).
 ³⁵ In fact, countries were skill-biased programs have been used rather successfully were done so under not-

³⁵ In fact, countries were skill-biased programs have been used rather successfully were done so under notso-democratic regimes. Two examples in our sample are Chile in the eighties (Pinochet) and Peru in the nineties (Fujimori).

downsizing appears to be behind the marginally positive result in the case of skill-biased retrenchment and prices further suggests that adverse selection may be the culprit.

In fact, while governments resort to a different array of productivity-identification methods in order to select which workers to fire and which to keep, the evidence above shows that their application results in the opposite effect to the one originally desired, that is, lower privatization prices instead of higher ones. Buyers may not be willing to pay higher prices since, when the best workers leave, re-composition of the labor force can be very costly and take considerable time. Permanent loss of know-how and damage to the productive structure may have occurred, for instance, as a result of a loss in complementarities between factors of production.

5. A SILVER BULLET: RE-HIRES AFTER PRIVATIZATION

According to the results above, a negative link between labor restructuring and privatization prices is not puzzling. The reason why prospective buyers may want to pass on the opportunity of having governments deal with bloated labor forces, severance packages, and simply, house clean up through worker dismissal appears to be linked with the fact that the quality of human capital loss can be considerable. Recomposing human capital in the form of searching and training can be a very slow and not necessarily a successful process, especially in those instances where firm-specific know-how was lost. Consequently, privatization prices may be penalized.

As much as adverse selection appears to be a reasonable factor why buyers may not be willing to bid higher prices for state-owned enterprises, it may be the case that other unobserved but correlated factor may producing the observed negative link between labor downsizing and privatization prices. The question is whether there is a measure

23

that can provide strong evidence on the presence of adverse selection in the downsizing process prior to privatization. In short, is there a silver bullet?

In the context above, notice that it may be possible that firms pursue the option of re-hiring the workers that were let go prior to privatization. If achieved, firms would be saving substantial time and effort in search and training. Re-hires provide a very good measure of the quality of the downsizing process and allow a better understanding of the pervasiveness of adverse selection during retrenchment³⁶. After all, it is by no means obvious that a firm would want to re-hire a worker that was deemed expendable a relatively short time ago, unless, of course, the retrenchment before privatization was badly done. In fact, Nearly 35 percent of firms did some re-hiring after privatization, of which Latin America was the most active with upwards of 40 percent, and Asia the least active with a little more than ten percent³⁷. This is shown in Figure 4

In theory, if firms were able to fully rehire all the good workers that were previously fired at zero cost, privatization prices would not be penalized. However, more often than not, such is not the case and in practice, a negative link between retrenchment and prices will likely remain. The reasons are simple. First, since the best workers are the ones that left first, chances are they are already employed elsewhere and have no intention or incentive to come back to the old firm. Second, additional incentives are needed to re-hire workers after privatization, which will likely increase the cost of rehiring. It is not easy to lure good workers back, especially given their potential

³⁶ While Haltiwanger and Singh (1999) introduced a similar concept, we are the first to apply rigorous econometric methods using re-hires. We work with re-hires up to 18 months after privatization. We tested shorter periods (12 months) and longer ones (24 months) and the empirical results do not vary. ³⁷ According to our data nearly 70 percent of firms did hire more personnel after privatization. This number

³⁷ According to our data nearly 70 percent of firms did hire more personnel after privatization. This number is misleading for total increases in personnel are due not only to new hires of workers not previously associated with the firm, but as explained above, also with re-hires. While the former may be attributed with the natural progression of privatized firms as an on-going concern, as mentioned above, the latter may be reasonably linked with the quality of the downsizing prior to privatization.

alternatives outside. The offering of additional pay, perks, or higher position may be necessary. Third, legal considerations may not allow fired workers to be re-hired³⁸. Finally, workers move and are not easily reachable which again will increase costs. If firms are willing to rehire workers despite of potentially increased costs both in monetary and administrative terms it is probably because such workers are worth it. These further suggest that rehires are a very good indicator to measure the quality of the downsizing process prior to privatization.

From the findings in the previous section, it is clear that, with respect to privatization prices, some downsizing measures are relatively worse than others. Voluntary downsizing measures and, in particular, age-biased measures, are particularly bad, while compulsory measures, in particular, skill-biased ones, appear to be relatively good. If adverse selection is the culprit, it is expected that the link between the outcome of the particular downsizing measure considered and the likelihood of rehiring maintain a similar pattern. In other words if, indeed, voluntary downsizing is linked with adverse selection, as suggested from the results with prices, the probability of rehiring should be high. On the other hand, if skill-biased downsizing adequately identifies productive workers from less productive workers then the probability of rehiring should be lower.

A first approach that re-hires are an ideal measure of the quality of the labor downsizing process prior to privatization may be illustrated by studying its relationship with voluntary downsizing as an explanatory variable. Using re-hires as the dependent variable, we find that the coefficient of the voluntary downsizing variable is positive and statistically significant at five percent. That is, voluntary downsizing before privatization

³⁸ This is particularly true in cases where public sector participation in the privatized firm is kept. This legislation is usually enacted because of revolving door and double dipping issues.

increases the probability of re-hiring workers after privatization³⁹. Results are shown in the upper panel of Table 13, specification 1. In fact, since typical voluntary downsizing mechanisms are theoretically flawed with adverse selection problems, this finding is not surprising (Jeon and Laffont, 1999; Kahn, 1985). As mentioned above, workers that leave voluntarily are usually those that have the highest chances of obtaining work outside in less time. They are also the ones that are more able to find better-matched jobs to their abilities and skills outside of the public sector and quasi-public sector.

On the other hand, it may be argued that the incidence of re-hires after privatization may not necessarily reflect the presence of voluntary downsizing but the presence of high labor firing costs and related rigidities. Perhaps, prospective firm buyers may want to take advantage of regulations that allow for a "clean slate" approach so that state-owned enterprises are permitted to have as many workers as possible retrenched before privatization only to be re-employed by the privatized firm. In this way, high labor costs are avoided while the human capital of the firm is preserved. To test for this idea, two labor cost measures are employed. The first is an indicator of labor rigidities as measured by the extent to which the country has signed agreements with the International Labor Organization and comes from Rama and Artecona (2001). This variable is defined as the cumulative number of ILO conventions ratified by the country at the time of privatization and is based on legal documents as compiled by Rama and Artecona.

The second variable is an index of labor firing costs constructed from legislation from Heckman and Pages (2001). This measure summarizes the tenure-severance pay profile using a common set of dismissal probabilities across countries and computes the expected future costs, at the time a worker is hired, of dismissing her in the future (also

³⁹ This, when controlling for share sold, sectoral dummies, macroeconomic controls (rate of growth, rate of

see Table 1).⁴⁰ We find that the coefficients of both labor rigidity measures are negative but statistically non-significant using re-hires measures. This is also shown in the upper panel in Table 13. It appears that labor rigidities do not change the probabilities of re-hires when controlling for voluntary downsizing.

Re-hiring after privatization occurred not only at the firm level, but in some instances it also occurred from the very same departments or areas from which the workers had been previously fired. When exploring this more restrictive measure of rehires as the dependent variable we find that the coefficient of the voluntary downsizing variable is not statistically significant. This is shown in the lower panel in Table 13, specification 2. Data are the likely culprit of this result as only 4.7 percent of the sample re-hired in the same department or area, compared to more than 34 percent that simply re-hired (see Figure 4). Thus, not too much weight should be attributed to this result⁴¹. Additionally, and similar to the rehires variable, labor rigidity measures yield negative and statistically non-significant coefficients with respect to the re-hires-same variable. This is also shown in the lower panel in Table 13.

Voluntary downsizing is only part of the story. In fact re-hires after privatizations are closely linked with the targeting sometimes applied before privatization according to skills, age, and gender. This is shown in fist column in the upper panel of Table 14. Using re-hires as the dependent variable, we find that the age-targeted retrenchment variable yields a positive and statistically significant sign at one percent. Age-targeted

inflation, initial gross domestic product), and continental dummies.

⁴⁰ Since the Heckman and Pages (2001) sample is relatively limited we also use an alternative measure suggested by them, law origin. They show that French law origin is very highly correlated with labor separation costs. In fact, we find very similar results. We would be happy to provide these additional estimations upon request.
⁴¹ As mentioned above, another explanation may be related with the fact that enticing the best workers back

⁴¹ As mentioned above, another explanation may be related with the fact that enticing the best workers back after having them fired entails an additional cost. Additional pay or position be necessary. In this context,

retrenchment prior to privatization increases the probability of re-hiring by a huge 31 percent after privatization. On the other hand, the skill-targeted coefficient is negative and statistically significant at five percent. Skill targeting decreases the probability that firms will employ re-hires after privatization by 16 percent. Finally, the female-biased retrenchment is positive but it is not statistically significant. These results are quite consistent with our findings regarding net privatization prices. In fact, they strongly suggest that adverse selection may be a problem, as voluntary downsizing increases prices but age-biased downsizing reduces prices and increases the probability of re-hiring after privatization, while skill-biased downsizing marginally increases net privatization prices and reduces the probability of re-hiring after privatization. Even more revealing, the results above hold when using the more restrictive re-hiring measure. These findings are shown in the lower panel of Table 14. Again, the corresponding coefficient for the age-biased variable is positive and statistically significant at one percent while the coefficient of the skill-biased variable is negative and statistically significant at five percent ⁴².

Similar to the case with voluntary downsizing, the incidence of rehires after privatization may not necessarily reflect poor management, but high labor firing costs and related rigidities. To explore this issue, we run probit regressions using the same two measures of labor costs used above. This is also shown Table 14. When using ILO conventions as an additional explanatory variable we find that such control is negative but statistically non-significant. Excessive labor costs and regulations do not seem to be a determinant on the probability of re-hires after privatization. Moreover, the signs and

the fact that the more restrictive measure of re-hires after privatization is not significantly linked with voluntary downsizing before privatization is not surprising.

⁴² As before the coefficient of the female -biased variable is positive but it is not statistically significant.

statistical significance of the age and skills variables do not change. The age-bias variable is always positive and is statistically significant at one percent in both re-hires and rehires-same. Age-biased downsizing prior to privatization increases the probability of rehires increase by 32 percent and increases the probability of re-hires in the same department by 16 percent. On the other hand, the skill-bias variable is always negative, implying a lower probability of re-employment as it is statistically significant at five percent for both re-hires in general and re-hires from the same department or area in the firm. Skill-biased downsizing prior to privatization is linked with a lower probability of re-employment that ranges between 1 percent (re-hires-same) and 17 percent (general rehires). Very similar results are obtained when using the Heckman-Pages firing costs In fact, this variable is negative but statistically non-significant variable instead. suggesting that high firing costs do not seem to have a bearing in the probability of rehires. The signs of the skill-bias and age-bias variables are maintained, as well as their corresponding statistical significance. However, the statistical coefficient of the skill-bias variable decreases to ten percent in the case of general rehires⁴³.

Finally, analogous to the analysis performed with privatization prices, Tables 15 and 16 provide evidence related with voluntary targeting and compulsory targeting, respectively.⁴⁴ According to our results in Table 15, voluntary age-biased downsizing increases the probability of re-hiring between 18.2 percent and 20.1 percent, as the corresponding coefficients in the three specifications presented are positive and

⁴³ We also use data for temporary workers, defined as those workers that were downsized prior to privatization but were re-hired after privatization on a temporary basis, presumably in order to take advantage of lower labor costs. As expected, we find that both the ILO and firing cost variables increase the probability of temporary hiring. Also, we find that voluntary downsizing increases the probability of temporary hiring.

⁴⁴ Lack of observations did no allow us to provide further evidence using "re-hires same" as the dependent variable for these two tables.

statistically significant⁴⁵. This finding further provides evidence of adverse selection. On the other hand, voluntary skill-biased downsizing yields the expected, negative sign, as before but in this case the corresponding coefficients are statistically non-significant. Similarly, Table 16 shows that compulsory age-biased downsizing does imply a higher probability of re-hiring as the corresponding signs are positive and statistically significant at five percent or better regardless of the specification. When labor downsizing was done according to age and in a compulsory manner, the probability of being re-hired will increase between 19 and 22 percent after privatization. Similarly, compulsory skillbiased downsizing prior to privatization appears to lower the probability of re-hiring after privatization. The results in this case are, however, not very clean as the skill-biased measure becomes barely significant when including labor costs (Heckman-Pages measure) or not significant at all (ILO conventions case).

In summary, our findings with respect to rehiring policies are consistent with the adverse selection hypothesis in labor restructuring by the government before privatization. What governments do before privatization does have a direct bearing on how firms behave after privatization. Voluntary downsizing is associated with a 13-15 percent higher probability of re-hiring workers that were previously fired prior to privatization. Age-biased downsizing yields a higher probability of re-hiring workers, which in the case of voluntary age-biased downsizing reaches around 20 percent, and in the case of compulsory age-biased downsizing reaches around 22 percent, sometimes re-hiring workers even in the same exact departments. The one exception to these results is skill-based downsizing which in some specifications leads to significantly lower rehiring rates by private firms.

⁴⁵ However, statistical significance using the Heckman-Pages labor firing costs reaches only ten percent.

6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Despite its importance, labor has probably been the single least addressed issue in privatization (Megginson and Netter, 2001). There is ambivalence with respect to the optimal policy approach to labor restructuring in privatization processes as reflected by the recommendations of development agencies around the world. In fact, such institutions have had a difficult time taking a position on whether or not it is a good idea to restructure a firm and, in particular, how to deal with labor force changes prior to privatization. Early advice called for labor restructuring prior to privatization under the premise that governments are better able to cushion any financial blow to displaced workers mainly through safety nets (Nellis and Kikeri, 1989). Subsequent recommendations called for a less meddlesome approach by discriminating between large firms and smaller ones. It was suggested that smaller firms with relatively little overstaffing were sold with essentially no labor restructuring, under the logic that such a decision should be left to the new owners who would be in better position to choose which workers they would like to retain or dismiss (Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley; 1992). A final view came later when prior restructuring in privatization, including the labor area, was found to be associated with lower net privatization prices paid by winners (Lópezde-Silanes, 1997).

This paper is the first to provide a formal cross-country analysis of the effects of a detailed list of labor restructuring measures before privatization to provide guidance for those countries still embarking in the privatization process. The lack of information on what happens to workers during the privatization process has exacerbated the fears and concerns of workers and governments, and delayed privatization in several countries (Kikeri, 1999). We address some policy concerns above by testing several competing

theories that aim to answer the following key question: should governments restructure labor before privatization, as measured by privatization prices? While as a general principle, getting rid of redundant workers should increase the privatization price, in practice, governments have a very difficult time identifying the genuinely redundant workers as asymmetric information problems remain. Worse, firing the wrong workers may reduce the privatization price.

Our data allows us to analyze the impact of labor restructuring measures not only in prices, but also in the rehiring policies followed by firms after they are privatized. The benefit of such data is that we are able to say something about the quality of retrenchment policies followed by governments around the world and, in particular, we are able to investigate adverse selection issues. In fact, we find that while overall labor retrenchment does not significantly impact privatization prices, if anything, voluntary downsizing has a negative impact on net prices, suggesting a potential problem of adverse selection. Through a detailed analysis of various targeting policies, the paper also shows that government administration of the downsizing process may also result in adverse selection reflected in the rehiring of the same workers after privatization.

Politically palatable downsizing mechanisms such as voluntary downsizing programs are very costly in terms of adverse selection. More elaborate mechanisms, such as compulsory skill programs are politically very difficult to implement, but appear to be better at identifying the more productive workers from the less productive ones. In fact, we did find that it might be possible for governments to achieve some positive results through the managing of the process by using a skill-focused retrenchment. This type of policy is associated with lower probability rates of rehiring of the same workers after privatization. However, such a policy is one associated with negative political consequences as workers may find it too aggressive and may react negatively towards the whole process of privatization program in a country. The fact that the political costs of this type of programs are higher suggests that there may be some not easily observable or measurable firm characteristics that could explain the marginally positive results of these policies. Another reason for this result is the possibility that the level of documentation and design of this type of program simply makes it more palatable to buyers. The political difficulties of using such policy and the problems it might cause in terms of the overall objective of achieving privatization should be considered.


The summary of this paper is that governments should think long and hard before they restructure labor force in preparation for privatization. The political consequences may be large, the impact on privatization prices is not there, and the data on rehiring policies shows that firms where retrenchment takes place may end up losing some of its most valuable workers. While a qualified non-intervention policy appears to be the safest bet in labor retrenchment before privatization, another policy alternative might be to set up a social safety net or labor reallocation program before privatization, and then let the new private owners decide who is redundant and who is not. Setting up the program before privatization may help with the political viability of the process and letting the new owners manage the retrenchment may help avoid adverse selection.

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
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
DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATIZATIONS BY REGION (%)

Source: Data collected by authors. Original List based on 1500 firms. Sample reflects 308 firms.




ACCUMULATED DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATIZATIONS BY YEAR (%)

Source: Data collected by authors. Original List based on 1500 firms. Sample reflects 308 firms.



DISTRIBUTION OF PRIVATIZATIONS BY SECTOR (%)

^{1/} Includes land and unclassified firms. Source: Data collected by authors. Original List based on 1500 firms. Sample reflects 308 firms.



LABOR RE-HIRING BY REGION (%)

Data collected by authors. Original List based on 1500 firms. Sample reflects 308 firms.

TABLE 1Description of Variables

Variable	Description
T SHERNING	Arvissgriftid
Firm Characteristics	
Net privatization price/sales	The pet present value of the nominal price of sale in \$U.S. dollars after all privatization and restructuring costs are taken
	into account adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold, and divided by total sales before privatization.
Sales	The net present value of the three -year average of firm rales before privatization denominated in \$U.S. dollars
Net total liabilities	Dummy variable equal to 1 if net total labilities are greater than zero up to three years prior to privatization,
- 1949-053 - 19 <u>28</u>	and 0 otherwise.
Preprivatization profits	Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company made any profits up to three years prior to privatization, and 0 otherwise
Sector	Dummy variable equal to 1 to take into account for economic sector. Three dummies are considered that account for mining, industry, and services, respectively, and 0 otherwise (reflecting land, natural resources.agriculture, or unclassified)
danagement change	Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company changed CEO up to three years prior to privatization, and 0 otherwise
and current currents	a must a more often to a me contant) conditioners do to mare four base to businessed and consistent
rivatization Characteristics	5
oreign participation	Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign participation was allowed in the privatization process, and 0 otherwise.
hare sold	Percentage of firm's shares sold in privatization.
ype of sale	Dummy variable equal to 1 to take into account for method of privatization sale. Two dummies are considered to account
5000000000	for initial public offering and direct (non-competitive) sales respectively, and 0 otherwise (reflecting other methods such as
	purchases by employees, joint ventures, or secondary offerings).
igent bank	Dummy variable equal to 1 if leading agent bank organized privatization process. Leading agent bank is defined as bank that
	organized most privatizations in the country at the time of our research. Agent banks are in charge of obtaining information
	on the state-owned enterprise, suggest restructuring measures, and organize the sale itself.
Labor Characteristics	
fnions	Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm had unions up to three years prior to privatization, and 0 otherwise.
olitical affiliation of unions	Durning variable equal to 1 if political affiltion of union is the same as the political party linked with the ruling government
and the second second to a life of the	at the time of provaization, and 0 otherwise
Rnikes	Dummy variable equal to 1 if there were any kind of protests, picketing, or strikes up to three years prior to privatization,
	and O otherwise
abor Policies	
owninizing	Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm undertook any downaizing in the labor force up to three years prior to privatization, 0
	otherwise. Downsizing may be classified as voluntary or compulsory, and may be targeted according to age (age-biased
	downsining), skills (skill-biased downsining), gender (female-biased downsining), or may be neutral (no particular group targeted)
Voluntary Downsizing	Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was any kind of voluntary downsizing in the labor force three years prior to privatization.
	0 otherwise. Voluntary downsizing is defined as any non-compulsory, worker-based decision downsizing. Typically severance packages, pension enhancements, and other benefits are offered to incentive workers to leave the firm.
age-biased downsizing	Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was any age-biased labor downaizing up to three years prior to privatization, 0 otherwise.
de onnes community	Age-biased programs may be voluntary (early retirement, pension enhancements) or involuntary.
Soil-biased downsizing	Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was any skill-biased labor downsizing up to three years prior to privatization, 0 otherwise.
	Skil-biased programs restrict the program along detailed occupational or skill groupings (Haltwanger and Singh, 1999) for example,
	through the passing of written or oral examt, panel interviews, and so on. Skill-biased programs may be voluntary or involuntary.
Female-biased downsizing	Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was any female-biased labor downsizing up to three years prior to privatization, 0 otherwise.
	Female-biased programs may be voluntary or involuntary. Since typically there are no explicit policies on this, there tends to be
	underreporting as firms would not want to admit on gender discrimination
imployment Guarantee	Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was any promise of employment guarantee up to three years prior to privatization, 0 otherwise.
Pay Out	Dummy variable equal to 1 if there was any pay cut to the total salary or wage of the worker three years prior to privatization,
	0 otherwise
te-hires	Dummy variable equal to 1 if the privatized firm re-hired previously fired workers (up to three years prior to privatization) they existing the observation of the privatized firm of the privatized firm of the privatization of the privatized firm of the
	after privatization, 0 otherwise
e heres same	Dummy variable equal to 1 if the president from re-bired consistency fixed students (ins to these more origin to interchantical)
le-hires same	Dummy variable equal to 1 if the privatized firm re-hired previously fired workers (up to three years prior to privatization) and placed the worker in the same department or are from which he was originally fired. 0 otherwise
	Dummy variable equal to 1 if the privatized firm re-hired previously fired workers (up to three years prior to privatization) and placed the worker in the same department or are from which he was originally fired, 0 otherwise
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Country-Specific Variables Law origin Bross domestic product inflation Openness Continental dummies Continental dummies Economic growth Fiscal deficits Same of the public sector LO Conventions	and placed the worker in the same department or are from which he was originally fired, 0 otherwise Legal origin of the country from which company is geographically based upon. Fire possible legal origins considered: origin. English common law, French civil Code ; German commercial code, Scandinawian code, and socialist laws (La Porta, Lopez- de-Slanes, Shlefer, and Vishur, 1998) Gross domestic product (USE PPP) in logs. Average of the three years prior to privatization (World Bark, 2001a) Average run of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product three years prior to privatization (World Bark, 2001a) Dumny equal to 1 if to account for the following regions: Latin America, Asia, Middle East, Africa, Developed Countries, 0 otherwise. Average rate of growth of the country three years prior to privatization (World Bark, 2001a) Average fixed deficite as a percentage of gross domestic product three years prior to privatization (World Bark, 2001a) Dumny equal to 1 if to account for the following regions: Latin America, Asia, Middle East, Africa, Developed Countries, 0 otherwise. Average fixed deficites as a percentage of gross domestic product three years prior to privatization (World Bark, 2001a) Average fixed deficites as a percentage of gross domestic product three years prior to privatization (World Bark, 2001a) Employment in the central government, in thousards of percent as a percentage of the labor force. Includes workers of both sexes Based on payroll and club service centoses (Rann and Artecona, 2001) Cumulative number of International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions ratified by the country at the time of privatization. Based on legal documents (Rann and Artecona, 2001) Measure that summarizes the tenore-severance pay profile using a common set of discussing her an the future due to unflororable economic conditions. The undes is constructed to include only firing costs that affect firm's decinion's at the margin. It includes the cost of pro

	Number	Percentage of sales
Firms in our final sample	308	97.21
Firms that supplied incomplete information	25	1.04
Firms merged and keep no independent records	19	0.12
Firms that were liquidated an no longer exist	22	0.78
Firms that denied or refused to give information	26	0.85
All Privatized Firms (1982-2000)	400	100.00

TABLE 2OBSERVATIONS IN THE SAMPLE


This table breaks our world sample between 1982 and 2000 into two groups. For each group we provide the number of firms and the percentage of pre-privatization sales in the total. Source: Data collected by authors.

SUMMARY STATISTICS

Variable	Obs	Mean	Median	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Firm Characteristics:						
Net Privatization Prices/sales	308	0.587	0.609	3.228	0.000	1.367
Sales	308	1.415	0.140	3.167	0.001	21.991
Net total liabilities	308	0.432	0.000	0.496	0.000	1.000
Preprivatization profits	308	0.455	0.000	0.499	0.000	1.000
Mining	308	0.143	0.000	0.350	0.000	1.000
Industry	308	0.231	0.000	0.422	0.000	1.000
Services	308	0.558	1.000	0.497	0.000	1.000
Management change	308	0.449	0.000	0.498	0.000	1.000
Privatization Characteristics:						
Foreign participation	308	0.682	1.000	0.467	0.000	1.000
Share sold	308	0.509	0.506	0.282	0.010	1.000
Public offering	308	0.653	1.000	0.477	0.000	1.000
Direct Sale	308	0.198	0.000	0.399	0.000	1.000
Labor Characteristics:						
Unions	308	0.844	1.000	0.363	0.000	1.000
Strikes	308	0.474	0.000	0.500	0.000	1.000
Labor Policies:						
Downsizing	308	0.782	1.000	0.413	0.000	1.000
Voluntary downsizing	308	0.325	0.000	0.469	0.000	1.000
Age-biased downsizing	308	0.497	0.000	0.501	0.000	1.000
Skill-biased downsizing	308	0.130	0.000	0.337	0.000	1.000
Female-biased downsizing	308	0.058	0.000	0.235	0.000	1.000
Employment guarantee	308	0.282	0.000	0.451	0.000	1.000
Pay cut	308	0.075	0.000	0.263	0.000	1.000
Re-hiring	292	0.345	0.000	0.475	0.000	1.000
Re-hiring Same	292	0.047	0.000	0.321	0.000	1.000
Country-Specific Variables:						
English common law	308	0.253	0.000	0.436	0.000	1.000
French commercial code	308	0.500	0.500	0.501	0.000	1.000
German commercial code	308	0.117	0.000	0.322	0.000	1.000
Scandinavian commercial code	308	0.019	0.000	0.138	0.000	1.000
Socialist/communist laws	308	0.110	0.000	0.314	0.000	1.000
Gross domestic product	308	25.398	25.452	1.851	19.448	28.856
Inflation	308	109.876	11.485	292.683	0.618	1667.207
Openess	308	31.137	28.158	31.953	0.000	314.588
Economic growth	308	3.028	2.726	3.811	-11.144	21.320
Fiscal deficits	308	-2.580	-2.279	3.475	-14.003	13.629
ILO conventions	221	54.164	52.000	28.883	1.000	123.000
Labor firing cost	151	2.526	2.718	1.216	0.443	4.756

 TABLE 4

 DECOMPOSITION OF LABOR DOWNSIZING MEASURES



This table shows the decomposition of labor downsizing cases in our sample in terms of cases and percentages (in parenthesis). Downsizing may be voluntary or compulsory (non-voluntary). Additionally, it may be classified according to its targeting nature as age-biased, skill-biased, and female-biased. Thus, voluntary and compulsory downsizing may be targeted. Since one firm may opt to pursue more than one targeted downsizing method, biases do not add up to 100 percent. For instance, one firm may concurrently pursue age-biased downsizing and skill-biased downsizing in its downsizing program. The corresponding numbers for all the possible combinations are shown in (*) and (**).

	Latin America	Asia	Africa and Middle East	Developed Countries	Transition Economies	All
Downsizing	82.2%	58.3%	79.7%	79.2%	76.2%	78.2%
Voluntary downsizing	32.5%	12.5%	45.3%	28.6%	14.3%	32.5%
Age-biased downsizing	57.4%	29.2%	54.7%	54.5%	26.6%	49.7%
Skill-biased downsizing	12.5%	13.9%	9.4%	15.6%	11.9%	13.0%
Female-biased downsizing	5.0%	8.3%	14.1%	0.0%	4.8%	5.8%
Employment guarantee	8.4%	20.1%	51.6%	13.0%	52.4%	28.2%
Pay cut	8.9%	0.0%	1.6%	13.0%	7.1%	7.5%
Sample	32.8%	7.8%	20.8%	25.0%	13.6%	100.0%

LABOR RESTRUCTURING MEASURES AROUND THE WORLD

Source: Data collected by authors.

	Downsizing	Voluntary downsizing	Age-biased downsizing	Skill-biased downsizing	Female-biased downsizing	Employment guarantee	Pay cut
Downsizing	1						
Voluntary downsizing	0.3656ª	1					
Age-biased downsizing	0.5239 ^a	0.4483 ^a	1				
Skill-biased downsizing	0.2037 ^a	0.1447	0.1184	1			
Female-biased downsizing	0.0643	0.0342	-0.0261	0.1508	1		
Employment guarantee	0.1036	0.027	0.0113	0.0365	0.2126 ^a	1	
Pav cut	-0.0456	-0.0099	-0.009	-0.0584	-0.0803	-0.0788	1

SIMPLE CORRELATION OF LABOR DOWNSIZING MEASURES

^a significant at 1 percent; ^b significant at 5 percent; ^c significant at 10 percent

		SOEs where measure was taken	SOEs where measure was not taken	Difference	T-statistic for change in mean ^{1/}
		(a)	(b)	(a)-(b)	Z-statistic for change in median ^{2/}
Downsizing					
	mean	0.5532	0.7085	-0.1552	3.547 ^a
Voluntary downsizing	median	0.5711	0.7070	-0.1360	3.576 ^a
	mean	0.4818	0.6376	-0.1557	4.064 ^a
	median	0.4716	0.6259	-0.1543	3.909 ^a
Age-biased downsizing					
	mean	0.5265	0.6467	-0.1202	3.320 ^a
	median	0.5136	0.6320	-0.1184	3.184 ^a
Skill-biased downsizing					
	mean	0.5616	0.5908	-0.0292	0.534
Female-biased downsizing	median	0.6074	0.6157	-0.0083	0.371
I emaie-blased downsizing	mean	0.3533	0.6015	-0.2482	3.213 ^a
	median	0.3765	0.6150	-0.2482	2.977 ª
Employment guarantee	meutan	0.3703	0.0130	-0.2383	2.911
	mean	0.4200	0.6496	-0.2296	5.853 ^a
	median	0.3664	0.6508	-0.2844	6.936 ^a
Pay cut					
	mean	0.6893	0.5787	0.1106	-1.585 °
	median	0.7424	0.6006	0.1417	-1.725 °

LABOR RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION PRICES: TESTS OF MEANS AND MEDIANS

Table 7 reports mean and median values of the privatization price/sales in the group of firms both where the labor restructuring measure was taken compared to those firms where the labor restructuring measure was not taken. The particular measure taken is indicated in the lines (downsizing, voluntary downsizing, age-biased downsizing...) The third column shows the difference in mean and medians between the net privatization price of the group of firms that took the measure compared to the group that did not. The fourth column reports the resulting t-statistics and z-statistics of the difference in means and medians of the two groups respectively. 1/ T-test for Ho about difference between means. Unequal N's 2/ Z-test for Ho about difference between medians. Unequal N's. (Wilcoxon rank sum). ^a significant at 1 percent; ^b significant at 5 percent; ^c significant at 10 percent

TABLE 8 INSTRUMENTS FOR POTENTIALLY ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES

	Agent Bank	Management Change	Political affiliation of unions	Pre- privatization profits	Law origin ^{1/}	Continental dummies ^{2/}	Macro controls ^{3/}	F-statistic on excluded instruments
Downsizing	yes		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	4.32
Voluntary downsizing	yes	yes		yes	yes	yes	yes	3.88
Age-biased downsizing		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	3.72
Skill-biased downsizing		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	3.23
Female-biased downsizing		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	3.09
Employment guarantee	yes		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	3.18
Pay cut	yes		yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	3.36

1/This set includes English Common Law, German Commercial Law, Scandinavian Commercial Law.

2/ This set includes Latin America, Asia, Africa and Middle East, Developed Countries.

3/ This set includes unemployment rate, fiscal deficit, openness, growth, and size of public sector.

Table 8 reports the group of instruments used in the first-step regression. The rows give the names of the dependent variables in the first-step regression. The columns describe the different groups of instruments used in each regression writing a "yes" if that group is used in the estimation of each dependent variable. The last column gives the F-statistic on the excluded instruments.

LABOR RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION PRICES Dependent variable is net privatization price/sales

Variables			Two-Step p	orocedure			Two-Step p	orocedure
valiables	OLS	TOBIT	OLS	TOBIT	OLS	TOBIT	OLS	TOBIT
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1 Firm and privatization characteristics:	b	b	а	a	ь	ь	b	а
Net total liabilities	-0.0903	-0.0918	-0.2113	-0.2142	-0.0887	-0.0897	-0.1455	-0.145
	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.072) b	(0.062)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.057)	(0.053) b
Share Sold	-0.0040	-0.0037	-0.0021	-0.0028	-0.0039	-0.0036	-0.0036	-0.0033
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Foreign participation	0.1502 ^a	0.1657 "	0.1229 ^a	0.1376 ^a	0.1439 ^a	0.1606 ^a	0.1413 "	0.1558 [°]
	(0.032) b	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.029)
Public offering	0.0911	0.1339	0.0855	0.1315	0.0927	0.1364	0.0895	0.1339
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Direct Sale	-0.0007	0.0482	-0.0079	0.0441	-0.0018	0.0481	-0.0044	0.0463
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.045)
Labor Characteristics:								
Jnions	-0.1484	-0.1250	-0.1536	-0.1314	-0.1487	-0.1242	-0.1641	-0.1413
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.037)
trikes	-0.0075	-0.0172	-0.0191	-0.0197	-0.0069	-0.0179	-0.0323	-0.0386
	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.038)	(0.040)
- Labor Policies:								
Downsizing	-0.0619	-0.0600	0.0284	0.0215				
	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.038)				
oluntary downsizing					-0.0773 ^a	-0.0692 ^b	-0.0572 ^b	-0.0561 °
	9	9	h	9	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.029)
Employment guarantee	-0.0927 "	-0.0956	-0.0862 ^b	-0.091	-0.1005	-0.1024	-0.0996	-0.103 "
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.030) _b	(0.033)	(0.031)
Pay cut	-0.0650	-0.0723	0.0803	0.0692	-0.0688	-0.0762	0.0306	0.0155
· · · · · ·	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.091)	(0.104)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.093)	(0.110)
Macroeconomic Variables:	а	a	a	a	а	а	a	a
Gross Domestic Product	0.0514	0.0533	0.0525	0.0553	0.0512	0.0533	0.0447	0.0467
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010) c	(0.009)
nflation	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001 °	0.0001
	(0.000) _b	(0.000) _a	(1.128) b	(0.728) _a	(0.000) _b	(0.000) a	(1.841) c	(1.353) _a
Constant	-0.7242	-1.1126	-0.8489	-1.2934	-0.7211	-1.1236	-0.6119	-1.0373
	(0.310)	(0.238)	(0.332)	(0.283)	(0.299)	(0.237)	(0.330)	(0.270)
bservations	292	308	292	308	292	308	292	308
R-squared	0.53		0.546		0.536		0.528	
:	21.99		24.59		23.39		22.97	
Prob > F	0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000	
Pseudo R2		1.327		1.3471		1.338		1.3184
LR chi2		314.26		317.23		316.86		312.24
Prob > chi?		0.000		0.000		0.000		0.000

The dependent variable is net privatization price/sales, defined as the amount that accrues to the government after all privatization and restructuring costs are taken into account, such as government commitments at the time of sale, and other adjustments are made to the sale contract. This number is adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold and is divided by the average net sales during the three years prior to privatization. The present value of the resulting number as of December 2000 is used. Columns (1), (2) (5) and (6) consider prior restructuring measures and the rest of variable as "exogenous" and provide estimates from OLS and TOBIT regressions. Column (3), (4), (7) and (8) show the second stage of the two-step procedure in order to account for endogeneity. All regressions include sectoral controls and firm size controls. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ^a significant at 1 percent; ^b significant at 5 percent; ^c significant at 10 percent

TABLE 10 LABOR TARGETING AND PRIVATIZATION PRICES Dependent variable is net privatization price/sales

Variables			Two-Step proced	ure
	OLS	TOBIT	OLS	TOBIT
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
- Firm and privatization characteristics:				
let total liabilities	-0.0891 b	-0.0926 ^b	-0.0932	-0.0952
	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.080)	(0.069)
Share Sold	-0.004 ^b	-0.0038 ^b	-0.0038 ^b	-0.0035 ^b
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Foreign participation	0.1506	0.1652 ^a	0.142 ^a	0.1564 ^a
	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.028)
Public offering	0.0863 ^b	0.1289 ^a	0.0971 ^b	0.1407 ^a
	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Direct Sale	-0.0029	0.0462	0.0086	0.0585
	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.045)
Labor Characteristics:	· · ·			
Jnions	-0.1321 ^a	-0.109 ^a	-0.1784 ^a	-0.1537 ^a
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Strikes	-0.0041	-0.0128	0.009	0.0001
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.054)	(0.050)
- Labor Policies:	· · · ·	. ,	. ,	. ,
Age-biased downsizing	-0.0832 ^a	-0.0843 ^a	-0.0833 ^a	-0.0823 ^a
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.030)
kill-biased downsizing	0.0161	0.0039	0.1616	0.1532 °
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.097)	(0.086)
emale-biased downsizing	0.0082	0.0274	0.0170	0.0115
entale entaled downshing	(0.059)	(0.056)	(0.095)	(0.097)
Employment guarantee	-0.0992 ^a	-0.1025 ^a	-0.1029 ^a	-0.1064 ^a
inproviment gantance	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.031)
Pay cut	-0.0726 °	-0.0798 °	0.0749	0.0564
uy cut	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.119)	(0.122)
- Macroeconomic Variables:	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.119)	(0.122)
Gross Domestic Product	0.0539 ^a	0.0565 ^a	0.0461 ^a	0.0483 ^a
Hoss Domestic Flouter				
	(0.009) 0.0001	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)
nflation		0.0001	0.0001	0.0001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-0.8018 ^a	-1.1946 ^a	-0.3127	-0.7673
	(0.291)	(0.237)	(0.425)	(0.352)
bservations	292	308	292	308
R-squared	0.54		0.54	
7	20.05		19.73	
Prob > F	0.000		0.000	
Pseudo R2 .R chi2		1.357 321.34		1.364 323.04
$LR \ cm2$ Prob > chi2		321.34 0.000		323.04

The dependent variable is net privatization price/sales, defined as the amount that accrues to the government after all privatization and restructuring costs are taken into account, such as government commitments at the time of sale, and other adjustments are made to the sale contract. This number is adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold and divided by the average net sales during the three years prior to privatization. The present value of the resulting number as of December 2000 is used. Columns (1) and (2) consider prior restructuring measures and the rest of variable as "exogenous" and provide estimates from an OLS and TOBIT regressions. Columns (3) and (4) show the second stage of the two-step procedure to take account of endogeneity. All regressions include sectoral controls and firm size controls. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ^a significant at 1 percent; ^b significant at 5 percent; ^c significant at 10 percent

Variables			Two-Step pro	cedure
	OLS	TOBIT	OLS	TOBIT
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1 Firm and privatization characteristics:	b	b	c c	
Net total liabilities	-0.0863	-0.087	-0.1331	-0.1348
	(0.040) b	(0.043)	(0.073) b	(0.065)
Share Sold	-0.0039	-0.0036	-0.0039	-0.0036
	(0.002) a	(0.002) a	(0.002)	(0.002)
Foreign participation	0.1464 "	0.1623	0.1433	0.1572 "
	(0.032)	(0.029) a	(0.031) b	(0.029) a
Public offering	0.0863	0.1308	0.0932	0.1366
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.042)	(0.041)
Direct Sale	-0.0099	0.0408	0.0045	0.0545
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.047)	(0.046)
2 Labor Characteristics:				
Unions	-0.1412 ^a	-0.1164 ^a	-0.1682 ^a	-0.1428 ^a
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Strikes	-0.0077	-0.0189	-0.0262	-0.0336
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.040)	(0.041)
3 Labor Policies:				
Voluntary age-biased downsizing	-0.0933 ^a	-0.0823 ^a	-0.0517 ^b	-0.0494 ^b
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Voluntary skill-biased downsizing	0.0319	0.0252	0.0295	0.0136
,	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.057)	(0.056)
Voluntary female-biased downsizing	-0.1348 °	-0.132	0.0077	0.0134
,	(0.069)	(0.103)	(0.052)	(0.046)
Employment guarantee	-0.099 ^a	-0.1005 ^a	-0.1037 ^a	-0.1071 a
Employment gamanee	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.031)
Pay cut	-0.0644	-0.0723	0.0029	0.0234
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.125)	(0.129)
4 Macroeconomic Variables:	(01011)	(0.011)	(01120)	(0112))
Gross Domestic Product	0.0513 ^a	0.0533 ^a	0.0465 ^a	0.049 ^a
Cross Domestic Product	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Inflation	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001
milation	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-0.7168 ^a	-1.1205 a	-0.5996	-1.0611
Constant				
	(0.296)	(0.237)	(0.361)	(0.294)
Observations	292	308	292	308
R-squared	0.54		0.53	
F	22.98		21.26	
Prob > F Pseudo R2	0.000	1.352	0.000	1.3558
LR chi2		320.13		313.97

TABLE 11 **VOLUNTARY TARGETING AND PRIVATIZATION PRICES** Dependent variable is net privatization price/sales

0.000 The dependent variable is net privatization price/sales, defined as the amount that accrues to the government after all privatization and restructuring costs are taken into account, such as government commitments at the time of sale, and other adjustments are made to the sale contract. This number is adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold and divided by the average net sales during the three years prior to privatization. The present value of the resulting number as of December 2000 is used. Columns (1), (2) consider prior restructuring measures and the rest of variable as "exogenous" and provide estimates from an OLS and TOBIT regressions. Columns (3), (4) show the second stage of the two-step procedure to take account of endogeneity. All regressions include sectoral controls and firm size controls. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ^a significant at 1 percent; ^b significant at 5 percent; ^c significant at 10 percent

0.000

Variables			Two-Step pr	rocedure
	OLS	TOBIT	OLS	TOBIT
1 Firm and animatication about the station	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
1 Firm and privatization characteristics:	b	b		
Net total liabilities	-0.0888	-0.0925	-0.0641	-0.0697
	(0.042) a	(0.044) b	(0.074) b	(0.069) b
Share Sold	-0.0043	-0.0042	-0.0037	-0.0034
	(0.002) a	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Foreign participation	0.1517	0.1659	0.145	0.1584
	(0.032) _b	(0.029) a	(0.031) b	(0.028) _a
Public offering	0.095	0.1356	0.0962	0.139
	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.041)
Direct Sale	-0.0007	0.0461	0.0004	0.0496
	(0.048)	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.046)
2 Labor Characteristics:	a	a	а	a
Unions	-0.147	-0.1231	-0.1709	-0.1477
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.037)
Strikes	-0.0171	-0.0257	0.0278	0.0197
	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.050)
3 Labor Policies:				
Compulsory age-biased downsizing	-0.0211	-0.0322	-0.0137	-0.0425
	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.100)	(0.104)
Compulsory skill-biased downsizing	0.0266	0.011	0.0624	0.0722 °
	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.038)	(0.042)
Compulsory female-biased downsizing	0.0709	0.1081	-0.0504	-0.0559
	(0.071)	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.069)
Employment guarantee	-0.1003 ^a	-0.1021 ^a	-0.0989 ^a	-0.1024 ^a
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.032)
Pay cut	-0.0704	-0.0786°	0.2176	0.2135
	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.132)	(0.142)
4 Macroeconomic Variables:				
Gross Domestic Product	0.0517 a	0.0545	0.0499	0.0524^{a}
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Inflation	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	-0.7866 ^a	-1.1795 ^a	-0.4776 ^c	-0.9101 ^b
	(0.300)	(0.242)	(0.475)	(0.460)
Observations	292	308	292	308
R-squared	0.53		0.53	
a.	19.49		20.14	
Prob > F	0.000		0.000	
Pseudo R2		1.3248		1.3182
LR chi2		313.74		312.20

TABLE 12COMPULSORY TARGETING AND PRIVATIZATION PRICESDependent variable is net privatization price/sales

The dependent variable is net privatization price/sales, defined as the amount that accrues to the government after all privatization and restructuring costs are taken into account, such as government commitments at the time of sale, and other adjustments are made to the sale contract. This number is adjusted by the percentage of company shares sold and divided by the average net sales during the three years prior to privatization. The present value of the resulting number as of December 2000 is used. Columns (1), (2) consider prior restructuring measures and the rest of variable as "exogenous" and provide estimates from an OLS and TOBIT regressions. Columns (3), (4) show the second stage of the two-step procedure to take account of endogeneity. All regressions include sectoral controls and firm size controls. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. ^a significant at 1 percent; ^b significant at 5 percent; ^c

-			Depende	nt Variable: re-hire		
	Probit	dF/dX	Probit	dF/dX	Probit	dF/dX
	(1)		(2)		(3)	
Voluntary downsizing	0.3476	(0.170) ^b [0.1292]	0.3741	(0.198) ^b [0.1374]	0.4027	(0.240) ^c [0.1581]
Union	0.7863	(0.270) ^a [0.2373]	0.5006	(0.313) [0.1598]	1.1636	(0.888) [0.3492]
ILO Conventions			-0.0002	(0.004) [-0.0001]		
Labor Firing Cost					-0.1199	(0.096) [-0.0468]
Constant	-1.947	(1.334)	-3.9402	(2.052) ^b	-1.1906	(0.617) ^b
Observations	202		214		146	
Observations	292		214		146	
Log likelihood	-179.87		-130.22		-94.92	
Wald chi2	16.8		9.19		7.92	
Prob>chi2	0.010		0.031		0.054	

VOLUNTARY DOWNSIZING AND RE-HIRING	VOLUNTARY	DOWNSIZING AND	RE-HIRING
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	Dependent Variable: re-hire same						e		
	Probit (1b)		dF/dX	Probit (2b)		dF/dX	Probit (3b)		dF/dX
Voluntary downsizing	0.0758	(0.253)	[0.0068]	0.0897	(0.289)	[0.0087]	0.1010	(0.111)	[0.0187]
Union	0.2795	(0.458)	[0.0204]	0.1313	(0.486)	[0.0113]	0.1728	(0.346)	[0.0123]
ILO Conventions				-0.0030	(0.004)	[-0.0003]			
Labor Firing Cost							-0.0730	(0.152)	[-0.0072]
Constant	-4.9733	(1.680) *	L	-3.3286	(2.328)		-3.4810	(2.012) °	
Observations	292			214			146		
Log likelihood	-51.89			-39.81			-37.12		
Wald chi2	7.03			6.23			6.03		
Prob>chi2	0.060			0.07			0.08		

All Regression include: partial privatization dummy, sectoral dummies, country macro controls, and continental dummies. Standard errors and marginal effects are given in parentheses and brackets respectively.

^a significant at 1 percent; ^b significant at 5 percent; ^c significant at 10 percent

LABOR TARGETING AND RE-HIRES

		Dependent Variable: re-hire							
	Probit		dF/dX	Probit		dF/dX	Probit		dF/dX
	(1)			(2)			(3)		
Age-biased downsizing	0.885	(0.170) ^a	[0.3100]	0.9453	(0.198) ^a	[0.3200]	0.8354	(0.242) ^a	[0.3114]
Skill-biased downsizing	-0.512	(0.242) ^b	[-0.1624]	-0.5894	(0.288) ^b	[-0.1778]	-0.5827	(0.315)	[-0.2089]
Female-biased downsizing	0.557	(0.360)	[0.2141]	0.7464	(0.450)	[0.2861]	0.0577	(0.825)	[0.0223]
Union	0.633	(0.283) ^b	[0.1936]	0.2859	(0.325)	[0.0931]	0.9826	(0.610)	[0.3090]
ILO Conventions				-0.0002	(0.000)	[-0.0001]			
Labor Firing Cost							-0.0450	(0.118)	[-0.0175]
Constant	-1.974	(1.390)		-4.1495	(1.976) b		-3.8461	(2.747)	
Observations	292			214			146		
Log likelihood	-164.49			-118.09			-88.48		
Wald chi2	47.13			34.17			20.38		
Prob > chi2	0.000			0.000			0.000		

]	Dependent	Variable:	re-hire sam	e-hire same		
	Probit (1b)		dF/dX	Probit (2b)		dF/dX	Probit (3b)		dF/dX
Age-biased downsizing	0.9907	(0.248) ^a	[0.1664]	1.0145	(0.245) ^a	[0.1612]	0.8945	(0.334)	[0.1521]
Skill-biased downsizing	-0.1389	(0.070) ^b	[-0.0060]	-0.2741	(0.139) ^b	[-0.0140]	-0.2615	(0.115)	' [-0.0131]
Female-biased downsizins	0.1108	(0.583)	[0.0164]	0.1211	(0.620)	[0.0201]	0.1614	(0.609)	[0.0193]
Union	0.2801	(0.522)	[0.0380]	0.4801	(0.642)	[0.0488]	0.3814	(0.542)	[0.0512]
ILO Conventions				-0.0017	(0.004)	[-0.0029]			
Labor Firing Cost							-0.0585	(0.149)	[-0.0138]
Constant	-3.0785	(1.596) ^c		-3.7566	(1.901) ^c		-4.1594	(2.979)	
Observations	292			214			146		
Log likelihood	-87.91			-67.11			-62.51		
Wald chi2	20.1			22.15			12.21		
Prob > chi2	0.001			0.003			0.070		

All Regression include: partial privatization dummy, sectoral dummies, country macro controls, and continental dummies. Standard errors and marginal effects are given in parentheses and brackets respectively.

^a Significant at 1 percent: ^b significant at 5 percent: ^c significant at 10 percent

TABLE 15
VOLUNTARY TARGETING AND RE-HIRING

	Dependent Variable: re-hire							
	Probit		dF/dX	Probit		dF/dX	Probit	dF/dX
	(1)			(2)			(3)	
Voluntary age-biased downsizing	0.486	(0.189) ^a	[0.1825]	0.5438	(0.223)	^b [0.2012]	0.4696	(0.261) ^c [0.1850]
Voluntary skill-biased downsizing	-0.230	(0.357)	[-0.0793]	-0.6009	(0.433)	[-0.1778]	-0.4238	(0.506) [-0.1571]
Voluntary female-biased downsizing	-0.276	(0.727)	[-0.0932]	-0.1348	(0.779)	[-0.0459]	-0.1241	(0.788) [0.0323]
Union	0.499	(0.259) ^b	[0.1638]	0.1576	(0.292)	[0.0540]	0.8966	(0.495) ^c [0.2993]
ILO Conventions				-0.0035	(0.004)	[-0.0012]		
Labor Firing Cost							-0.0772	(0.120) [-0.0303]
Constant	-0.798	(0.648)		-0.8361	(1.149)		-1.3176	(1.177)
Observations	292			214			146	
Log likelihood	-177.33			-125.82			-88.48	
Wald chi2	22.8			20.75			7.87	
Prob > chi2	0.000			0.000			0.040	

All Regression include: partial privatization dummy, sectoral dummies, country macro controls, and continental dummies. Standard errors and marginal effects are given in parentheses and brackets respectively.

^a Significant at 1 percent: ^b significant at 5 percent: ^c significant at 10 percent

	Dependent Variable: re-hire					
	Probit (1)	dF/dX	Probit (2)	dF/dX	Probit (3)	dF/dX
Compulsory age-biased downsizing	0.713	(0.190) ^a [0.2699]	0.726	(0.221) ^b [0.2695]	0.5602	(0.257) ^b [0.2201]
Compulsory skill-biased downsizing	-0.862	(0.353) ^b [-0.242]	-0.583	(0.366) [-0.1738]	-0.7775	(0.435) ^c [-0.2660]
Compulsory female-biased downsizing	0.738	(0.404) ^c [0.2861]	1.008	(0.538) [°] [0.3858]	0.3483	(0.869) [0.1382]
Union	0.449	(0.252) ^c [0.1480]	0.094	(0.301) [0.0323]	0.8522	(0.490) ^c [0.2858]
ILO Conventions			-0.0056	(0.004) [-0.0019]		
Labor Firing Cost					-0.0496	(0.120) [-0.0194]
Constant	-0.572	(0.649)	0.0014	(1.120)	-0.8201	(1.164)
Observations	292		214		146	
Log likelihood	-171.05		-121.4		-92.4	
Wald chi2	32.59		24.44		11.66	
Prob > chi2	0.000		0.000		0.040	

TABLE 16 COMPULSORY DOWNSIZING AND RE-HIRING

All Regression include: partial privatization dummy, sectoral dummies, country macro controls, and continental dummies. Standard errors and marginal effects are given in parentheses and brackets respectively. ^a Significant at 1 percent: ^b significant at 5 percent: ^c significant at 10 percent

APPENDIX 1

Variables	Probit Model
Preprivatization profits	-0.7573 ^a
	(0.168)
Political affiliation of unions	-0.1823 ^b
	(0.091)
Latin America	-0.1941
	(0.243)
Asia	0.1790
	(0.298)
Africa and Middle East	0.3652
	(0.304)
Developed Countries	0.3681
	(0.263)
English Common Law	-0.4983 ^c
	(0.277)
German Commercial Code	-0.3351
	(0.213)
Scandinavian Code	-1.0645 ^b
	(0.463)
Openness	0.0011
	(0.003)
Number of observations	308
Pseudo R Squared	0.205
F-statistics on excluded instruments	4.32
Prob>F	0.000

FIRST STAGE PROBIT

This appendix present the first-step regression of the two-step procedure for one of the potentially endogenous variables. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Regressions include agent bank dummy (not reported) ^a significant at 1 percent; ^b significant at 5 percent; ^c significant at 10 percent

Appendix 2 COUNTRY SAMPLE

Africa:					
1 Benin	(2)	31 Saint Vincent	(1)	58 Austria	(1)
2 Cape Verde	(1)	32 Peru	(13)	59 Belgium	(13)
3 Cote d'Ivoire	(10)	33 Puerto Rico	(1)	60 Bulgaria	(1)
4 Egypt	(6)	34 St. Kitts and Nevis	(2)	61 Croatia	(2)
5 Gabon	(1)	35 Trinidad and Tobago	(2)	62 Czech Republic	(2)
6 Ghana	(8)	36 Venezuela	(6)	63 Denmark	(6)
7 Kenya	(7)	37 Barbados	(2)	64 Estonia	(2)
8 Lesotho	(1)			65 Finland	(2)
9 Senegal	(2)	Asia:		66 France	(7)
10 South Africa	(4)	38 Bahrain	(1)	67 Germany	(5)
11 Tanzania	(2)	39 China	(1)	68 Hungary	(1)
12 Uganda	(6)	40 India	(1)	69 Ireland	(3)
13 Zambia	(3)	41 Indonesia	(3)	70 Italy	(7)
14 Madagascar	(3)	42 Israel	(1)	71 Latvia	(2)
		43 Japan	(8)	72 Lithuania	(2)
Americas:		44 Jordan	(1)	73 Netherlands	(3)
15 Argentina	(8)	45 Korea, Rep.	(5)	74 Poland	(10)
16 Belize	(2)	46 Kuwait	(2)	75 Portugal	(3)
17 Bolivia	(8)	47 Lao PDR	(1)	76 Russia	(3)
18 Brazil	(16)	48 Malaysia	(3)	77 Serbia	(1)
19 Canada	(4)	49 Pakistan	(1)	78 Slovak Republic	(2)
20 Chile	(4)	50 Philippines	(3)	79 Spain	(5)
21 Colombia	(9)	51 Qatar	(1)	80 Sweden	(3)
22 Dominican Republic	(2)	52 Singapore	(2)	81 Switzerland	(2)
23 El Salvador	(2)	53 Sri Lanka	(1)	82 Turkey	(2)
24 United States	(2)	54 Taiwan	(1)	83 United Kingdom	(13)
25 Grenada	(1)	55 Thailand	(1)		
26 Guatemala	(1)	56 Yemen, Rep.	(1)	Oceania:	
27 Guyana	(3)			84 Australia	(3)
28 Jamaica	(4)	Europe:		85 New Zealand	(4)
29 Panama	(2)				
30 Mexico	(8)	57 Albania	(2)		

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SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe
SUST SUST SUST SUST	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research:
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST ETA	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001 60.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project Efrem CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty and
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST ETA CLIM	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001 60.2001 61.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project Efrem CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty and Endogenous Technical Change: Implications for Kyoto
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST ETA	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001 60.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project Efrem CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty and Endogenous Technical Change: Implications for Kyoto Gian Luigi ALBANO, Fabrizio GERMANO and Stefano LOVO: On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST ETA CLIM PRIV	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001 60.2001 61.2001 62.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project Efrem CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty and Endogenous Technical Change: Implications for Kyoto Gian Luigi ALBANO, Fabrizio GERMANO and Stefano LOVO: On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST ETA CLIM	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001 60.2001 61.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed ConceptKari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in EuropeXueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the EnvironmentM. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of ForeignDirect InvestmentSavas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher InternationalCompetitiveness? Some New Theoretical InsightsRoldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade:Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised CountriesMatthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in theEnvironmental Restoration of Central and Eastern EuropeOnno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for theEnvironmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for PolandCarlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research:Lessons from the Human Genome ProjectEfrem CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty andEndogenous Technical Change: Implications for KyotoGian Luigi ALBANO, Fabrizio GERMANO and Stefano LOVO: On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria inAscending Auctions for Multiple ObjectsElbert DIJKGRAAF and Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: A Note on Testing for Environmental Kuznets Curves
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST ETA CLIM PRIV CLIM	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001 60.2001 61.2001 62.2001 63.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project Efferm CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty and Endogenous Technical Change: Implications for Kyoto Gian Luigi ALBANO, Fabrizio GERMANO and Stefano LOVO: On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST ETA CLIM PRIV	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001 60.2001 61.2001 62.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project Efferm CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty and Endogenous Technical Change: Implications for Kyoto Gian Luigi ALBANO, Fabrizio GERMANO and Stefano LOVO: On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST ETA CLIM PRIV CLIM	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001 60.2001 61.2001 62.2001 63.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project Efferm CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty and Endogenous Technical Change: Implications for Kyoto Gian Luigi ALBANO, Fabrizio GERMANO and Stefano LOVO: On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST ETA CLIM PRIV CLIM	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001 60.2001 61.2001 62.2001 63.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project Efferm CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty and Endogenous Technical Change: Implications for Kyoto Gian Luigi ALBANO, Fabrizio GERMANO and Stefano LOVO: On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects Elbert DJIKGRAAF and Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: A Note on Testing for Environmental Kuznets Curves with Panel Data
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST ETA CLIM PRIV CLIM	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001 60.2001 61.2001 62.2001 63.2001 64.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Orgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research; Lessons from the Human Genome Project Efferm CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty and Endogenous Technical Change: Implications for Kyoto Gian Luigi ALBANO, Fabrizio GERMANO and Stefano LOVO: On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST ETA CLIM PRIV CLIM	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001 60.2001 61.2001 62.2001 63.2001 64.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Restoration of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project Efrem CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty and Endogenous Technical Change: Implications for Kyoto Gian Luigi ALBANO, Fabrizio GERMANO and Stefano LOVO: On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in <
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST ETA CLIM PRIV CLIM CLIM	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001 60.2001 61.2001 63.2001 63.2001 64.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Ozgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Foreign Aid and Direct Investment: Key Players in the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project Effert CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty and Endogenous Technical Change: Implications for Kyoto Gian Luigi ALBANO, Fabrizio GERMANO and Stefano LOVO: On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in Ascending Auctions for Multiple Objects Elbert DIJKGRAAF and Herman R.J. VOLLEBERGH: A Note on Testing for Environmental Kuznets Curves with Panel Data
SUST SUST SUST SUST SUST ETA CLIM PRIV CLIM CLIM	53.2001 54.2001 55.2001 56.2001 57.2001 58.2001 59.2001 60.2001 61.2001 63.2001 63.2001 64.2001	Richard N. COOPER (xlviii): The Kyoto Protocol: A Flawed Concept Kari KANGAS (xlviii): Trade Liberalisation, Changing Forest Management and Roundwood Trade in Europe Xueqin ZHU and Ekko VAN IERLAND (xlviii): Effects of the Enlargement of EU on Trade and the Environment M. Orgur KAYALICA and Sajal LAHIRI (xlviii): Strategic Environmental Policies in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment Savas ALPAY (xlviii): Can Environmental Regulations be Compatible with Higher International Competitiveness? Some New Theoretical Insights Roldan MURADIAN, Martin O'CONNOR, Joan MARTINEZ-ALER (xlviii): Embodied Pollution in Trade: Estimating the "Environmental Load Displacement" of Industrialised Countries Matthew R. AUER and Rafael REUVENY (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Central and Eastern Europe Onno J. KUIK and Frans H. OOSTERHUIS (xlviii): Lessons from the Southern Enlargement of the EU for the Environmental Dimensions of Eastern Enlargement, in particular for Poland Carlo CARRARO, Alessandra POME and Domenico SINISCALCO (xlix): Science vs. Profit in Research: Lessons from the Human Genome Project Efferm CASTELNUOVO, Michele MORETTO and Sergio VERGALLI: Global Warming, Uncertainty and Endogenous Technical Change: Implications for Kyoto Gian Luigi ALBANO, Fabrizio GERMANO and Stefano LOVO: On Some Collusive and Signaling Equilibria in
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Network Coalition Theory Network Coalition Theory Network NRM CLIM CLIM ETA CLIM ETA SUST SUST SUST KNOW ETA NRM	20.2002 21.2002 22.2002 23.2002 24.2002 25.2002 26.2002 27.2002 28.2002 29.2002 30.2002 31.2002	Coalitions         Guillaume HAERINGER (liv): On the Stability of Cooperation Structures         Fausto CAVALLARO and Luigi CIRAOLO: Economic and Environmental Sustainability: A Dynamic Approach in Insular Systems         Barbara BUCHNER, Carlo CARRARO, Igor CERSOSIMO and Carmen MARCHIORI: Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage between R&D and Climate Cooperation         Andreas LÖSCHEL and ZhongXIANG ZHANG: The Economic and Environmental Implications of the US Repudiation of the Kyoto Protocol and the Subsequent Deals in Bonn and Marrakech         Marzio GALEOTTI, Louis J. MACCINI and Fabio SCHIANTARELLI: Inventories, Employment and Hours Hannes EGLI: Are Cross-Country Studies of the Environmental Kuznets Curve Misleading? New Evidence from Time Series Data for Germany         Adam B. JAFFE, Richard G. NEWELL and Robert N. STAVINS: Environmental Policy and Technological Change         Joseph C. COOPER and Giovanni SIGNORELLO: Farmer Premiums for the Voluntary Adoption of Conservation Plans         The ANSEA Network: Towards An Analytical Strategic Environmental Assessment Paolo SURICO: Geographic Concentration and Increasing Returns: a Survey of Evidence Robert N. STAVINS: Lessons from the American Experiment with Market-Based Environmental Policies Carlo GIUPPONI and Paolo ROSATO: Multi-Criteria Analysis and Decision-Support for Water Management at the Catchment Scale: An Application to Diffuse Pollution Control in the Venice Lagoon Robert N. STAVINS: National Environmental Policy During the Clinton Years A. SOUBEYRAN and H. STAHN : Do Investments in Specialized Knowledge Lead to Composite Good
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