



FONDAZIONE ENI
ENRICO MATTEI

An Assessment of the Past Performance and the Potential Future Role of the High Ambition Coalition

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My person

- Reason of my stay at FEEM/ICCG as Visiting Scholar: Master Thesis
- Topic: 'An Assessment of the Past Performance and the Potential Future Role of the High Ambition Coalition
- Motivation



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Contents

1. Introduction: The High Ambition Coalition and the Paris Agreement
2. Aim of the Work and Methods
3. The Past Performance of the High Ambition Coalition
4. The Potential Future Role of the High Ambition Coalition
5. Conclusion and Outlook


Introduction: The High Ambition Coalition (HAC)

- Characteristics
- Goals
 - Ambition mechanism
 - Recognition of 1.5 degrees
 - Operationalisation of temperature goal
 - 5-yearly updates
 - Support package
- Strategy



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Introduction: The High Ambition Coalition (HAC)



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Introduction: Recall: The Paris Agreement

- Targets
- Hybrid architecture
 - NDCs
 - Top-down requirements
- Details yet to be agreed



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
Aim of the Work and Methods

- Past performance of the HAC
 - Coalition and Negotiation Theory
 - Game Theory
 - Behavioural Economics
 - Qualitative negotiation analysis
- Future Potential Role of the HAC
 - Consideration of the results from experimental games from behavioural economics
 - Notion of a transformational climate club based on the literature on international relations
 - Qualitative analysis of national policies of representative HAC members



Aim of the Work and Methods

- Focus on ten countries (nine HAC members + one non-member)



Past Performance of the HAC

- Coalition as conceived in Coalition Theory
- Opportunistic and tactical alliance
- Factors for coalition formation and maintenance
 - Geographic proximity
 - Cultural ties
 - Relevance
 - Issue-specific power
 - Structural power
 - Moral power
 - Past relationships
 - Cartagena Dialogue
 - Durban Alliance
 - Personal ties
 - Size
 - Stakes
 - Vulnerability to climate change
 - Abatement costs

Past Performance of the HAC

- Proximity and homogeneity → Qualitative negotiation analysis
 - Analysis of submissions and statements from COP21 to COP22

Country	Negotiation Bloc	Country	Negotiation Bloc
Bangladesh	LDCs, G-77	Marshall Islands	AOSIS, G-77
Brazil	BASIC, G-77	Mexico	EIG
Colombia	AILAC, G-77	Norway	Umbrella Group
EU	EU	U.S.	Umbrella Group
The Gambia	AGN, LDCs, G-77	India	BASIC, LMDC, G77

Past Performance of the HAC

- Proximity and homogeneity → Qualitative negotiation analysis
 - AILAC, AOSIS, EIG, EU and Norway with high degree of congruence and mutual understanding
 - LDCs less vocal on some topics but also close to this group
 - U.S. sometimes with slightly different views
 - AGN often more conservative
 - Statement of The Gambia itself were much more progressive
 - Brazil indicated more progressive notions

Past Performance of the HAC

- Proximity and homogeneity → Qualitative negotiation analysis
 - Developing countries in HAC with strong focus on adaptation but also developed countries in HAC repeatedly highlighted the significance of adaptation
 - Statements and submissions reflected several goals of the HAC
 - However, recognition of 1.5 degrees not shared initially but seems to be acknowledged since COP21
 - Different opinions on provision on support
 - Strong dissent with India
 - Stronger emphasis on climate justice in the meaning of the polluter pays principle → need for differentiation
 - Need to ensure national sovereignty → full discretion for developing countries

Past Performance of the HAC


- Conclusion: Past performance of HAC can be assessed positively
 - HAC succeeded to reach goals at COP21
 - Media-savvy strategy
 - Balance between exclusivity and openness
 - Different negotiation strategies
 - Performance in the aftermath of COP21



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Past Performance of the HAC

- Conclusion: Past performance of HAC can be assessed positively **BUT**
 - Low degree of formality
 - Actions speak louder than words
 - Limitations of the Paris Agreement: Still on track to a 3 degree world



©UNEP (2016): The Emission Gap Report, p.xvi

Potential Future Role of the HAC

- How to close the ‘emission gap’? → notion of a ‘transformational climate club’!
 - = ‘Coalition of the willing’ implementing mitigation measures
 - Primary purpose is the provision of the public good
 - But the climate club should provide tangible benefits with club goods
 - Should acknowledge the primacy of the UNFCCC
 - Should embark on transformative pathways in line with science and targets of the Paris Agreement
 - Supported by experimental games in behavioural economics

Potential Future Role of the HAC

- ❖ Potential to turn into a transformational climate club?
- ❖ Actions speak louder than words → unilateral leadership?
- Analysis of national policies and INDCs of the ten entities



Potential Future Role of the HAC

- Republic of the Marshall Islands
 - + Progressive climate policy, also compared to other SIDS
 - + Aims to reduce greenhouse gas emissions significantly without any conditionality
 - 32% GHG emission reduction until 2025 compared to 2010
 - 45% GHG emission reduction until 2030 compared to 2010
 - ❖ Low issue-specific power
 - ❖ Dependency on foreign aid



Potential Future Role of the HAC

- The Gambia
 - + Seems to strive to skip the dirty phase of development as a LDC
 - + NDC is rated as 'sufficient' by the Climate Action Tracker
 - Sectoral mitigation actions concentrating on agriculture and renewable energies
 - ❖ Remains to be seen if this pathway will be continued under the new presidency of Adama Barrow



Potential Future Role of the HAC

- Bangladesh
 - + Has formulated a several unconditional mitigation measures in its NDC despite its status as LDC
 - 5% reduction against baseline emissions by 2030 (15% conditional)
 - + Wide array of climate legislature
 - E.g. Bangladesh Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan
 - Country aims to extensively expand coal power
 - ❖ Has pledged to aim to achieve 100% renewable energies as soon as possible as part of the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF)



Potential Future Role of the HAC

- Colombia
 - + Clean electricity sector
 - + First Latin American country that presented an INDC
 - 20% GHG emission reduction by 2030 against baseline (30% conditional on international support)
 - Has not ratified the Paris Agreement yet
 - High dependence on coal and oil exports (more than 50% of exports in 2015)
 - ❖ Historic peace agreement with uncertain environmental consequences



Potential Future Role of the HAC

- Brazil
 - + Global leader in biofuels and clean electricity sector
 - + Well-formulated NDC
 - Base year target instead of BAU scenario target: 37% GHG reduction by 2025 compared to 2005 and 43% by 2030
 - Targets look more ambitious than they actually are
 - Relaxation of forest policies has led to increased deforestation (from August 2015 until July 2016 area as big as Puerto Rico)
 - Severe political and economic crisis



Potential Future Role of the HAC

- Mexico
 - + Presented itself as a leader in climate policy
 - + Adopted a General Law on Climate Change
 - NDC is not in line with below 2 degrees
 - 25% emission reduction by 2030 compared to baseline emissions (40% conditional on global agreement with carbon price)
→ peak in 2026
 - Slowdown in ambition in NDC compared to 2020 pledge
 - 30% emission reduction relative to baseline emissions by 2020
→ peak before 2020



Potential Future Role of the HAC

- European Union
 - + Has been credited for its past climate leadership
 - + Extensive legislature on energy and climate
 - + Largest donor of climate finance
 - EU ETS is plagued by an oversupply of allowances and does not provide any market signal
 - EU is in the middle of its greatest crisis after 'Brexit' and vast disagreements




Potential Future Role of the HAC

- Norway
 - + Leading position in electrification of transport sector
 - + Target to reach greenhouse gas neutrality by 2030
 - + Considerable donor of climate finance, especially for forest initiatives
 - Dependency on oil and gas production
 - Recently rising trend of emissions



Potential Future Role of the HAC

- United States of America
 - ❖ Obama administration mandated EPA to take regulatory actions due to difficulties to pass climate legislation in Congress
 - + NDC represents step forward
 - Election of Donald Trump has fundamentally changed this situation



Potential Future Role of the HAC

- India
 - + Ambitious goals for expansion of renewable energy capacity (175 GW in total by 2021)
 - + Recently announced the intended abandonment of many coal power plants (37 plants under construction, 178 GW in planning pipeline)
 - NDC does not represent these developments
 - Reduction of emission intensity of GDP by 33% to 35% by 2030 compared to 2005 and 40% of electric power capacity from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030 conditional on international support
 - Low transparency of NDC



Conclusion and Outlook

- No significant difference between scrutinised HAC members and India with respect to ambition in INDCs and national climate policies
- Election of Donald Trump is a game changer → HAC will no longer exist as it entered the arena during COP21
 - Future of the HAC is very unclear
 - Potential to turn into a transformational climate club appears to be lower than ever



- Transformational climate club still urgently required
 - Enthusiastic countries of the HAC have a role to play
 - Club should be build around the provision of preferential market access and harmonisation of standards, intelligently combined with other incentives
 - Countries should stick to the Paris Agreement
 - Potential of a transformational climate club remains unclear but represent a feasible option
 - 2018 is the next big moment in climate policy = opportunity to announce the club

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!



- Questions?

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