


FEEM Seminar

18 April 2013, Venice

Second thoughts after the second trading period of EU ETS


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University of Graz



My agenda


- **Who knows the facts?**
 - **Monitoring 14.000 installations**
- **What may have gone wrong?**
 - **It is not only the oversupply of allowances**
- **What could still be done?**
 - **Facets of a fundamental structural reform**



Who knows the facts?


Monitoring more than 14.000 installations

Power sector dominates Accounts for 73 % of emissions



Highly unequal size distribution of installations


84 % installations account only for 10 % emissions



Short and long positions



Overall market

- Only in 2008 the market was in a short position
- The net positions result from a wide variation of long and short positions



Market fragmentation Power and NonPower sectors


- Power sector rather short
- NonPower sector was always long
- Differences between trading periods



Net positions of countries 2008 - 2012

- The overall market was long
- Country positions differ


EU ETS Net Positions
All sectors 2008-2012



Dispersion of country positions 2008 - 2012


- Only 4 countries are short
- Many countries show wide variation of gross positions

EU ETS 2008 - 2012 Net Position
All Sectors




Characteristics of the top 16 % emitters


90 % of emissions




Power (small)




NonPower (small)



Power (big)




NonPower (big)



First conclusions from the evidence of a fragmented EU ETS market

- **Top 16 % emitters account for 90 % of emissions**
 - **About $\frac{3}{4}$ belong to Power sector**
- **Impact of carbon price on Power sector**
 - **Add carbon costs to electricity**
 - **Only a very high carbon price triggers a fuel shift or a switch to renewables**
- **Impact of carbon price on nonPower sector**
 - **So far hardly effective because of over-allocations**
- **Impact of carbon price on small emitters**
 - **Modest because of rather low impact on production costs**



What may have gone wrong

It is not only the oversupply of allowances

(1)

Rethinking the cap & trade paradigm

What do we know about marginal abatement costs?

- **MAC are the foundations of the cap & trade paradigm**
 - They justify cost minimization argument
- **Important role given to MAC stems from SO₂ abatement**
 - Identifiable because of add-on technologies
- **It is rather difficult to identify MAC for CO₂ abatement**
 - Mostly integrated not separable technologies
 - Few add-on technologies, e.g. CCS
 - CGE models pretend to know MAC

Options and cost of CO₂ abatement

Abatement options	Operating decisions no investments	Investment decisions different levels of investments
Change of output		
Change of energy efficiency		
Change of energy mix		

- What abatement options are available in the operating and investment phase of an installation?
- How are operating and investment cost calculated?
 - User cost of capital based on depreciation and interest rates
 - Operating cost based on energy and carbon prices

Example 1: Using PV for substituting electricity from coal and gas

Investement


Investment cost	€/ kWel	1,600
Operating period	Years	20
Interest rate	% p.a.	2.5%
Inflation rate	% p.a.	-3.0%

Operating


Operating & Maintainance	% Invest.	1%
Normal capacity in full load hours	h p.a.	1,000

Cost

Fixed cost per kWh	€ Cent	8.8
Variable cost per kWh	€ Cent	0.0
Total cost per kWh	€ Cent	8.8




Example 2: From pulp mill to bio-refinery



The founding paradigm of cap & trade has turned out being too simplistic


- There is high uncertainty about abatement costs
- Abatement costs vary
 - ↗ Interest rates
 - ↗ Capital depreciation rates
 - ↗ Energy prices
 - ↗ Cyclical fluctuations
- Abatement costs may not be unique at all
 - ↗ e.g. joint production structures



(2)

Rethinking the role of carbon prices for technological change

Prices are not the only driver of technical change



The strategic technology policy of China

From the stringency of allowances to technical change

**Stringency
of
allowances**

**Carbon
price**

**Technical
change**



(3)

Interacting and conflicting EU 2020 targets




EU 2020 targets

- 20 % reduction of GHG emissions
- 20 % share of renewable
- 20 % less end-use energy

- One of these targets is redundant

- Perverse impacts of subsidies for renewables on electricity market
 - Switch from gas to coal



What could still be done

More than backloading and tightening

Steps for a structural reform of EU ETS


- **Drop up to 84 % of installations**
 - **This will still leave 90 % of emissions for trading**
- **No discrete trading periods but a long target path (up to 2050)**
 - **This will create confidence for investors**
- **Recycle auctioning revenues via a technology fund**
 - **This will support targeted technology policies**
- **Switch to a self-correcting supply mechanism**
 - **This will avoid the problems with fixed caps**

The current fixed cap based mechanism (1)

- **Fixed trading period**
 - **2013 - 2020**
- **Seemingly fixed cap**
 - **Uncertainly about offsets and tightening**



The current fixed cap based mechanism (2)



An emissions target path based mechanism (1)

- Long-run emissions path

 - 2013 - 2050

- Self-adjusting supply of allowances

 - Free and auctioning

Supply of allowances

The supply in the current period is equal to the notional supply as to the emissions target path plus the compensation of the previous period supply discrepancy

$$S = T - (T_{-1} - E_{-1})$$

S supply of allowances

T notional supply as to the emissions target path

E actual emissions

An emissions target path based mechanism (1)

- Long-run emissions path
 - 2013 - 2050
- Self-adjusting supply of allowances
 - Free and auctioning

Supply of allowances

The supply in the current period is equal to the notional supply as to the emissions target path plus the compensation of the previous period supply discrepancy


$$S = T - (T_{-1} - E_{-1})$$

S supply of allowances

T notional supply as to the emissions target path

E actual emissions

An emissions target path based mechanism (2)



A carbon intensity path based mechanism (1)

- Long-run carbon intensity path
 - 2013 - 2050
- Self-adjusting supply of allowances
 - Free and auctioning

A carbon intensity path based mechanism (2)


Supply of allowances

The supply in the current period is equal to the notional supply as to the emissions target path plus the compensation of the previous period supply discrepancy. The emissions target path is determined by a notional carbon intensity and actual output (GDP).

$$S = T - (T_{-1} - E_{-1})$$

$$T = I \cdot Q$$

S	supply of allowances
T	notional supply as to the emissions target path
E	actual emissions
I	carbon intensity path (C / Q)
Q	output (GDP)



Back to square one


A new framework for EU climate policy

EU needs to become aware of loosing in the global technology competition

National Science Board (2012): Science and Engineering Indicators

R&D expenditures for United States, EU, and 10 Asian economies: 1996–2009


Dollars (billions)



Asia-10 = China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand; EU = European Union

Value added of high-technology manufacturing industries, by selected region/country: 1998–2010

Dollars (billions)



The technology gap of EU vs. US and China is widening

EU climate policy needs to be better embedded into targeted technology policies

- Raising the awareness for pushing innovation
- Targeted technology policies
 - New processes – e.g. bio-refineries
 - New materials – e.g. carbon enforces polymers from renewables
 - Integrated processes – e.g. cogeneration of heat and electricity
 - Integrated R & D – e.g. information technologies and microbiology
- Financing issues have been overlooked
 - New long-term financing mechanisms needed
 - New roles for ECB and EIB

Thank you.

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