An Economist Tries to Grapple with Catastrophic Climate Change

Martin L. Weitzman European Lecture Tour (May-June, 2011)

A Black Swan is a highly improbable event with three principal characteristics: it is unpredictable; it carries a massive impact; and, after the fact, we concoct an explanation that makes it appear less random, and more predictable than it was – Nassim Taleb

The climate system is an angry beast and we are poking it with sticks - Wally Broecker

Preliminary Probing and Basic Issues

- Climate change characterized by deep structural uncertainties and an inability to exclude catastrophes. Sample of worrisome aspects:
- 800K Antarctic ice core record of CO₂ and temperature.
- Methane hydrates in permafrost and continental shelves.
- Unlimited downside liability. All eggs in one planetary basket.
- How bad might it get? With what probabilities? Do bad consequences increase faster or slower than probabilities decline?
- Are conclusions from existing CBAs and IAMs robust to the modeling of climate extremes? Is policy advice robust?
- Spirit of these numerical exercises: They are a bit wild, and I am a bit wild in presenting them, but no sense in pretending false precision. Exercises motivated by the need to perform simple and transparent "stress tests" on climate-change CBAs and IAMs.
- Representative of a line of research. Major finding: "robustness of non-robustness" in big-picture climate change economics.

Climate Sensitivity as Prototype Example of Uncertainty

- What is equilibrium climate sensitivity? What are its strengths and weaknesses as an aggregate measure and as a prototype example?
- Why is climate sensitivity uncertain? What is its PDF? How should we extrapolate its tail probabilities?
- If climate sensitivity is an *example* of uncertainty, then what is the ultimate reduced-form PDF whose fat tail *really* concerns us? ... and the answer is ... InD, where D≡B-W.
- Who knows how fat is the upper tail of the PDF of InD? ... and the answer is ... Nobody. Very long chain of very uncertain links.
- Is climate change policy better conceptualized as warding off deterministic damages or as buying an insurance policy against bad damages from bad temperatures? What difference does it make?
- How should the upper-half tail of the PDF of climate sensitivity be calibrated? ... and the answer is ... consistent with IPCC-AR4, here I calibrate $P[S \ge 3] = 50\%$ and $P[S \ge 4.5] = 15\%$.

Upper Tail of Climate Sensitivity PDF (two examples)

• Fat-tailed (polynomial or slower decline) Pareto or Power PDF:

$$f_{\mathbf{P}}(S) = 38.75958 \, S^{-3.969362}$$

• Thin-tailed (exponential or faster decline) Normal PDF:

$$f_{\mathsf{N}}(S) = \frac{1}{1.4473\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp\left(-\frac{(S-3)^2}{2(1.4473)^2}\right)$$

$\widehat{S} =$	3°C	4.5°C	6°C	8°C	10°C	12°C
$Prob_{\mathbf{P}}[S \geq \widehat{S}]$.5	.15	.06	.027	.014	.008
$Prob_{N}[S \ge \widehat{S}]$.5	.15	.02	.003	7×10^{-7}	3×10^{-10}

- How do we know if tail is Normal or Power or any other form of PDF?
- Are there plausible mechanisms via which thin-tailed PDFs (like Normal) become fat-tailed PDFs (like Student-t)?
- Why does the economics of climate change seem especially vulnerable to fat-tailed uncertainty?

Probabilities of T as Function of G=GHG Concentrations

- Transformation of variables: $T = [\ln (G/280) / \ln 2] \times S$
- Transformation of PDFs: $\psi_{I}(T \mid G) = f_{I}(T / [\ln (G/280) / \ln 2]) / [\ln (G/280) / \ln 2]$ for $I = \{P, N\}$
- Probabilities of exceeding temperature changes $T = 5^{\circ}$ C and $T = 10^{\circ}$ C for given G = ppm of CO₂e. (Why are $T = 5^{\circ}$ C and $T = 10^{\circ}$ C chosen as "iconic" temperature change examples?)

G:	400	500	600	700	800	900
Median T	1.5°	2.5°	3.3°	4.0°	4.5°	5.1°
Prob _P [T≥5°C]	1.5%	6.5%	15%	25%	38%	52%
Prob _N [T≥5°C]	10^{-6}	2.0%	14%	29%	42%	51%
Prob _P [T≥10°C]	.20%	.83%	1.9%	3.2%	4.8%	6.6%
Prob _N [T≥10°C]	10^{-30}	10^{-10}	10^{-5}	.1%	.64%	2.1%

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What are Damages of Ruinous Climate Change?!?

- Typical multiplicative quadratic damages: $Y(T) = Y/(1 + \gamma T^2)$.
- Why may be OK for small *T*. Why may be questionable for big *T*.
- No one knows damages for high global-average temperature changes.
- For want of better analogue, try something *really* wild here.
- Suppose person pays ΔM for decreasing probability of death by ΔP .
- VSL=Value of a Statistical Life = $\Delta M / \Delta P$.
- Extremely rough empirical estimate: VSL pprox 200 years of income.
- Crazily-tentatively identify "death of the planet" with $T=10^{\circ}$ C.
- Willingness to pay (income-years foregone) to keep G at 280 ppm.

G :	400	500	600	700	800	900
$W_{P}[T \ge 10^{\circ}C]$.4	1.7	3.8	6.4	9.6	13
$W_{N}[T \ge 10^{\circ}C]$	≈ 0	≈ 0	≈ 0	.16	1.2	4.2

• Includes *only* willingness to pay to reduce tail catastrophe: $T \ge 10^{\circ}$ C.

- Overestimate: impact will be centuries hence. Discounting, anyone?
- Underestimate: death of Earth bigger than death of John Smith = つへで

Concluding Questions and Comments

- Stress tests and sensitivity to how disasters are modeled and parameterized: is the glass half-empty or half-full?
- What about caveats, limitations? Will dynamics restore robustness?
- What about role of learning and mid-course corrections?
- What makes climate change so resistant to crisp policy conclusions?
- What is the appropriate role of climate change CBAs and IAMs?
- Should we inform policy makers about our inability to give robust policy advice in almost-unique case of climate change CBA?
- Beware of idea that a false impression of precision or robustness is required because "we have to recommend *something*"?
- Should we do more research about fatness of extreme tails of PDFs relative to more research about central tendencies? Is this "science"?
- Beware of fighting fat-tailed problems with fat-tailed solutions?
- Should we hope for the best but prepare for the worst by contingency planning for bad outcomes? Is there a possibly important niche role for last-resort options like geoengineering?