Determinants of State Aid to Car Manufacturers in the European Union

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Motivation

The focus on State aids in the EU

The European competition policy is unique in its control on state aid.

The rationale for control of state aid is the safeguard of market integration by protecting against:

- the possibility that less efficient firms which receive state aid prosper at the expense of more efficient that do not
- more rich member state will systematically give their firms competitive advantage over firms from less rich member state

Lisbon declaration in 2000: "less and better aid"

Motivation

The focus on the car industry

The current crisis has spurred a number of interventions to support the car industry

The Temporary Framework for the years 2009-10 is allowing Member States to grant aid with fewer controls

However, the industry has always been heavily subsidized

We focus on this industry to disentangle the different factors which can explain State aid policy in the EU in the last 20 years

Motivation

Research questions

- 1. Which are the determinants of state aid in the car sector?
- 2. Has the EU official statement "less and better aid" been effectively pursued in the car sector?
- 3. Is the granting of state aid the outcome of a repeated game in which member states dynamically (strategically) exchange on the possibility to provide subsidy?

We collect a unique database on state aids to firms in the car industry in the EU over the 1988-2008 interval

We analyse political and economic determinants of state aid

We disentangle between:

- aid to industry and services
- ▶ aid to the car industry: here we distinguish, case by case:

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- aid to increase capacity
- aid to reduce operating costs
- aid for rescue & restructuring

The dependent variable

Several empirical papers investigate the economic and political determinants of state aids (Neven 1994, Neven Roller 2000, Ganoulis Martin 2001, Zahariadis 2005 and 2010, Aydin 2007)

The dependent variable is generally defined as a ratio:

total aid total value added

We consider aid granted the sector, and general aid, in logs, and include industry's value added and total value added among the regressors

In this way we do not impose the coefficient on value added to be equal to one

The explanatory variables

The literature finds that political factors are relevant as well as economic issues

As we focus on aid to a specific industry, we include also industry-specific controls

	Economic variables	Political variables
Country	Income per capita;	Election year;
	Industrialization.	Polarization;
		Government political
		orientation;
		Time trend.
Inductor	Change in new car	Soronning schemos:
Industry	registrations;	Scrapping schemes;
	National champions;	Aid in other countries
	Import penetration	

We expect the country specific regressors to influence both total aid and aid to the car industry, while industry specific regressors are expected to affect aid to the car industry only

Since the same set of factors are affecting both explanatory variables, they can not be independently estimated

The SUR estimator (Zellner 1962) allows contemporaneous error terms in the two equations to be correlated.

Therefore, we jointly estimate:

Additionally, we distinguish *car_aid* by its aim, and we estimate the system:

Dependent Variable: a taxonomy of state aid

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Table 5.1 A taxonomy of state aid

Aid type	Potential benefit	Potential distortion
Horizontal		
Employment	Reduce labour market imperfections	Camouflage operating aid
Environment	Increase environmental quality	Camouflage operating aid
R&D	Promote innovation	Camouflage operating aid
Rescue & restructuring	Facilitate survival of	Preserve Fundamentally
	fundamentally sound firms	unsound firms
Small & medium sized	Ameliorate financial	Create or preserve
enterprise	and other market	fundamentally unsound firms
	failures that differently	
	affect small firms;	
	promote job creation	
Regional		
	Promote development	Aid wars; channel more aid to
	of peripheral regions	least developed regions of
		wealthiest member states than
	ę	to least developed regions of
		less wealthy member states
Sectoral		
Declining or	Ease labour market	Delay inevitable
consolidating	transitions; facilitate	reorganisation; favour firms
industries	restructuring; share	from richer member states; less
	adjustment costs	efficient firms survive, more efficient firms exit
Privatising Industries	Increase share of	Artificial advantage for former
	economy guided by	public firm
1	market forces	

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Dependent Variable

We classify each case, according to the aid type declared in the official documents, into three categories:

- aid aimed at increasing capacity (mainly regional aid, privatising industries, some R&D and environmental)
- aid aimed at reducing operating costs (training, environment, R&D)

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aid for rescue and restructuring

Dependent Variable

	EU12	EU15	EU25	EU27
1988	4770.76	-	-	-
1989	642.68	-	-	-
1990	70.01	-	-	-
1991	853.88	-	-	-
1992	3748.62	-	-	-
1993	388.55	-	-	-
1994	466.10	-	-	-
1995	377.40	377.40	-	-
1996	769.45	779.44	-	-
1997	57.24	57.24	-	-
1998	263.06	264.78	-	-
1999	310.32	310.32	-	-
2000	90.90	90.90	-	-
2001	342.88	342.88	-	-
2002	563.21	563.21	-	-
2003	123.80	154.37	-	-
2004	43.32	52.92	52.92	-
2005	123.43	132.40	132.40	-
2006	13.39	20.02	63.66	-
2007	23.48	23.48	171.21	171.96
2008	80.70	80.70	80.70	176.85

Source: Own elaboration from DG competition and OJEU (Million €, 2000)

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Dependent Variable

		Cumulated		Aid per
Country	Nr of cases	amount of nominal aid	Average nr of employees	employee (€
		(Million €, 2000)		2000)
Austria	2	37.01	31,642	1,169.60
Belgium	12	88.99	48,989	1,816.50
Czech Republic	1	169.47	107,183	1,581.10
France	3	61.08	234,926	260
Germany	4	494.25	864,436	571.8
Italy	8	371.59	170,518	2,179.20
Poland	6	86.73	111,607	777.1
Portugal	3	45.07	24,384	1,848.30
Romania	2	174.08	63,439	2,744.10
Slovakia	3	85.5	27,508	3,108.20
Spain	7	163.07	205,513	793.5
Sweden	2	17.51	205,513	85.2
United Kingdom	16	191.34	196,294	974.8
Total	69	1,985.69	2,291,951	866.4

Explanatory Variables - Economic variables

Data are sourced from Eurostat and/or EUKLEMS

- income per capita
- industrialization = share of manufacturing in total value added
- import penetration = $\frac{IMP_{ct}}{IMP_{ct} + PROD_{ct} EXP_{ct}}$

Data on car registrations are sourced from Eurostat and ACEA (European Automobiles Manufacturers' Association)

National champion = dummy equal to 1 if the aid is granted to an "historical" producer

Explanatory Variables - Political variables

- election year
- polarization = measure of polarization between government party and the four main parties of the legislature (source: Database of Political Institutions, WB)
- left-wing government= index of cabinet composition, ranging from 0 (hegemony of right-wing) to 5 (hegemony of left-wing) (source: Comparative Political Data Set, 2008)
- scrapping scheme= dummy equal to 1 if scrapping schemes are offered (source: Global Insight, 2010)

Results

1992-2007

	Aid to car industry	Total aid
industry's value added _{c.t-1}	0.313***	
	(0.0569)	
GDP _{c.t-1}		1.126***
,, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		(0.0387)
income per capita _{c.t-1}	-0.413**	-0.297***
	(0.209)	(0.109)
industrialization _{c.t}	-1.864	1.864**
с.,.	(1.773)	(0.839)
election year _{c.t}	0.210	0.0761
	(0.187)	(0.0887)
polarization _{c.t}	-0.151	0.175***
1 0,0	(0.107)	(0.0508)
left-wing government _{c.t}	-0.0538	-0.0193
<i>88 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8</i>	(0.0571)	(0.0264)
time trend	-0.0503**	-0.0201*
	(0.0251)	(0.0109)
change in new car registrations per capita _{c.(t-(t-1))}	-0.452	
	(0.439)	
aid to national champion _{c.t}	3.071***	
1 0,t	(0.294)	
import penetration _{c.t}	0.727**	
1 1 0,1	(0.285)	
scrapping scheme _{c.t}	0.643***	
	(0.248)	
aid to car industry in other countries $_{t-1}$	0.00428	
	(0.0700)	
total aid in other countries _{t-1}		-0.101
- t= 1		(0.106)
Constant	-2.666*	-7.428***
	(1.537)	(1.713)
Observations	213	213
R-squared	0.525	0.865

Results

1992-2007

	Aid to increase capacity	Aid to reduce operating costs	Total aid
industry's value added _{c,t-1}	0.243***	0.0898***	
	(0.0583)	(0.0313)	
GDP _{c,t-1}			1.125***
			(0.0387)
income per capita _{c,t-1}	-0.287	0.108	-0.296***
	(0.207)	(0.109)	(0.109)
industrialization _{c,t}	-0.573	-1.364	1.862**
	(1.815)	(0.972)	(0.839)
election year _{c,t}	0.301	0.153	0.0762
	(0.192)	(0.103)	(0.0887)
polarization _{c,t}	-0.243**	-0.0647	0.175***
	(0.109)	(0.0587)	(0.0508)
left-wing government _{c,t}	-0.0232	-0.0135	-0.0193
	(0.0587)	(0.0314)	(0.0264)
time trend	-0.0405*	0.0113	-0.0201*
	(0.0239)	(0.0115)	(0.0109)
change in new car registrations per capita $_{c,(t-(t-1))}$	-0.313	0.0502	
	(0.443)	(0.237)	
aid to national champion _{c,t}	2.269***	1.254***	
	(0.302)	(0.163)	
import penetration _{c,t}	0.436	0.526***	
	(0.292)	(0.156)	
scrapping scheme _{c,t}	0.468*	0.0957	
	(0.253)	(0.135)	
aid to increase capacity in other countries _{t-1}	-0.0622		
	(0.0554)		
aid to reduce operating costs in other $countries_{t-1}$		-0.0407	
		(0.0384)	
total aid in other countries _{t-1}			-0.101
			(0.106)
Constant	-1.631	-0.191	-7.410***
	(1.442)	(0.717)	(1.713)
Observations	213	213	213
R-squared	0.397	0.324	0.865

Results

Before and after Lisbon

	1992-1999			2000-2007		
	Aid to increase capacity	Aid to reduce operating costs	Total aid	Aid to increase capacity	Aid to reduce operating costs	Total aid
industry's value added _{c,t-1}	0.284**	0.0196		0.202***	0.117***	
	(0.118)	(0.0511)		(0.0669)	(0.0422)	
GDP _{c,t-1}			1.061***			1.091***
			(0.0720)			(0.0479)
income per capita _{c.t-1}	-0.713	0.302	-1.038***	-0.272	0.0736	-0.0576
, ,	(0.513)	(0.225)	(0.216)	(0.228)	(0.141)	(0.127)
ndustrialization _{c.t}	1.051	-2.190	2.161	-0.823	-1.445	1.923**
-,-	(3.295)	(1.437)	(1.471)	(2.149)	(1.357)	(0.978)
election year _{c.t}	0.176	0.0341	0.125	0.442*	0.243	0.0454
	(0.296)	(0.129)	(0.125)	(0.233)	(0.148)	(0.110)
polarization _{c.t}	-0.100	-0.0735	0.197***	-0.302**	-0.0259	0.164***
ι, τ	(0.196)	(0.0872)	(0.0757)	(0.128)	(0.0812)	(0.0634)
eft-wing government _{c.t}	0.0624	-0.0548	-0.0405	-0.0355	-0.0134	0.00107
	(0.115)	(0.0501)	(0.0486)	(0.0706)	(0.0446)	(0.0322)
ime trend	-0.0683	0.00174	-0.000119	-0.0669	0.0145	0.0207
	(0.0816)	(0.0375)	(0.0305)	(0.0557)	(0.0357)	(0.0263)
change in new car registrations per capita _{c.(t-(t-1))}	0.333	0.325	(0.02.02)	-0.504	-0.0400	(010200)
	(1.130)	(0.473)		(0.463)	(0.294)	
aid to national champion _{e.t}	3.174***	1.121***		1.636***	1.392***	
and to national enampion _{c,t}	(0.466)	(0.204)		(0.392)	(0.243)	
import penetration _{c.t}	0.273	0.242		0.449	0.623***	
import penetration _{c,t}	(0.590)	(0.242		(0.312)	(0.197)	
aronning scheme	0.390)	-0.148		0.408	0.242	
scrapping scheme _{c,t}	(0.393)					
	· ,	(0.173)		(0.347)	(0.217)	
aid to increase capacity in other $countries_{t-1}$	-0.266***			0.0223		
••• • • • • •	(0.101)	0.00044		(0.0653)	0.0010	
aid to reduce operating costs in other $countries_{t-1}$		-0.00844			-0.0812	
		(0.0551)	0.000		(0.0575)	0.105
total aid in other countries _{t-1}			-0.996***			-0.137
	2.025	1 (0 -	(0.318)	1	0 (1 -	(0.116)
Constant	-3.037	1.695	-0.0849	-1.044	-0.617	-6.393***
	(3.288)	(1.387)	(4.485)	(1.678)	(0.983)	(1.812)
Observations	89	89	89	124	124	124
R-squared	0.544	0.387	0.845	0.326	0.328	0.894

Conclusions

We investigate the determinants of state aid to the car industry in EU over the period 1992-2007 We find:

- 1. both political and economic variables are relevant
- 2. there is a structural break after the statement of the Lisbon strategy (2000)
- 3. there is a negative and significant trend over the period considered
- 4. the strategic game between Countries is significant before Lisbon