



# Heterogeneous Firms Trading In Ideas: An Application to Energy Technologies

**Innovation for climate change mitigation:  
a study of energy R&D, its uncertain  
effectiveness and Spillovers**

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FEEM Seminar 11/11/10

# 0. Outline

1. Motivation
2. Literature Review
3. Our Contribution
4. Patents
5. Stylized facts
6. Model
7. Empirical Strategy
8. Results
9. Conclusions/Future Research





# 1. Motivation: Technology and Development

- **Technology transfer (TT)** is an attractive options for countries with still limited innovative ability
- Both innovation and TT have received much attention in light of pressing **climate change issues** (change in perspectives in negotiation debates).
- Much remain to be understood with respect to how technologies move across countries and sectors
- In this paper, we focus on **technology transfer in energy technologies** as this sector is particularly relevant in the debate regarding Climate Change and Sustainable Development



## 2. Literature Review

- Induced innovation hypothesis points to both demand-push and technology-pull determinants (Popp 2002)
- Rich literature on innovation (both general and energy related)
- TT: most contributions focus on trade and FDI (economy-wide analyses)
- Limited evidence with respect to energy and climate change technologies, mostly due to lack of appropriate data
- Some evidence that CDM involved technology transfer (Dechezleprêtre et al. 2008)
- Notable exceptions: Dechezleprêtre et al (2009) Dekker et al (2009) but evidence is contradictory



## 2. Literature Review – Main Limitations

### 1. *Focus on developed countries*

- *relevant question is instead transfer from frontier innovators to laggards*

### 2. *Empirical analysis of TT include variables that “make sense”*

- *but do not necessarily have a framework of reference*

### 3. *Only a few technologies are considered*

- *mostly renewables*



### 3. Our Contribution

- Model inspired by recent trade literature that identifies the variables affecting the decision of innovating firms to protect a blueprint
- Test the model using data on power technologies
  - *strategic sector, relevant for development and with high mitigation potential*
- Focus on 47 countries
- **RESULTS:** (1) geographical distance hinders patenting; (2) Financial stability increases patenting; (3) environmental policy influences the probability of transfer; (4) sending and receiving knowledge stocks (proxies) play an important role



## 4. Patents: what they are

### ***Patents are***

1. *A set of exclusionary rights (territorial) granted by a state to a patentee*
2. *For a fixed period of time (usually 20 years)*
3. *In exchange for the disclosure of the details of the invention*

### ***Granted on inventions (devices, processes, etc) that are:***

1. *New (not known before the application of the patent)*
2. *Involve a non-obvious inventive step*
3. *Useful or industrially applicable*
4. *Patentee in US has the legal duty to cite prior art*

### ***Imperfect but useful indicator of inventive activity***

1. *Not all innovation are patented*
2. *Not all patented innovations have the same economic value*
3. *Propensity to patent may vary across countries and technological fields*



# 4. Patents: what they look like

## Fluidized bed reactor having a furnace strip-air system and method for reducing heat content and increasing combustion efficiency of drained furnace solids

**Bibliographic data** | Description | Claims | Mosaics | Original document | INPADOC LEGAL status

**Patent number:** US5390612 (A)  
**Publication date:** 1995-02-21  
**Inventor(s):** TOTH STEPHEN J [US]  
**Applicant(s):** FOSTER WHEELER ENERGY CORP [US]  
**Classification:**  
- international: F23C10/00; F23C10/24; F23C10/00; (IPC1-7): F23G7/00  
- european: F23C10/00D; F23C10/24  
**Application number:** US19930024041 19930301  
**Priority number(s):** US19930024041 19930301

[View INPADOC patent family](#)  
[View list of citing documents](#)

**Also published as:**  
EP0614043 (A1)  
JP7004615 (A)  
PT614043 (T)  
ES2137321 (T3)  
CA2116283 (A1)  
[more >>](#)

**Cited documents:**  
US3662719 (A)  
US4227488 (A)  
US4335661 (A)  
US4349969 (A)  
US4397102 (A)  
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### Abstract of US 5390612 (A)

A fluidized bed reactor having a furnace strip-air system and method for reducing heat content and increasing combustion efficiency of drained furnace solids in which a bed of particulate material is





## 4. Patents: why we use them

### ***With respect to energy and environmental technologies***

1. *Available at a high level of disaggregation*
2. *For a large number of countries*
3. *Patenting is likely a preferred means of protecting innovation in energy sector*
4. *Informs on “intended” (and unintended) knowledge flow*
5. *A set of exclusionary rights (territorial) granted by a state to a patentee*
6. *For a fixed period of time (usually 20 years)*
7. *In exchange for the disclosure of the details of the invention*

***Good source of historical data for a sector in which private R&D, trade and human capital data are very scarce***





## 4. Patents: what we select

- Efficiency improving fossil techs for electricity production
  - Coal preparation technologies, Improved burners, Boilers, Gas turbines and steam engines, Fluidized beds, Super-heaters, Combined cycle, CHP and co-generation Traditional power plants and burners efficiency improvements
- Renewables
  - Solar, Wind, Hydro, Geothermal, Biomass, Ocean
- We distinguish between Singulars, Claimed Priorities and Duplicate patents
- We track in how many countries each innovation has been patented




# 5. Stylized Facts


	FFS	REN	DUP FFS	DUP REN	% FFS cps	% REN cps	Dup/CP FFs	Dup/CP REN	Dup/patent FF	Dup/patent REN
Argentina,	11	27	6	56	36.4%	51.9%	1.500	4.000	0.545	2.074
Austria,	726	596	1427	1131	62.5%	56.9%	3.143	3.336	1.966	1.898
Australia,	354	934	327	1577	23.4%	41.5%	3.940	4.064	0.924	1.688
Belgium,	235	232	591	525	65.1%	73.7%	3.863	3.070	2.515	2.263
Brazil,	208	44	125	73	20.2%	56.8%	2.976	2.920	0.601	1.659
Belarus	25	22	1	7	4.0%	22.7%	1.000	1.400	0.040	0.318
Canada	976	495	1383	1066	60.2%	69.5%	2.352	3.099	1.417	2.154
Switzerland,	1487	840	3264	2660	63.8%	83.5%	3.443	3.795	2.195	3.167
China,	17697	263	154	139	0.6%	28.5%	1.525	1.853	0.009	0.529
Czechoslovakia,	663	14	122	35	5.9%	64.3%	3.128	3.889	0.184	2.500
Czech	540	703	86	51	8.1%	5.7%	1.955	1.275	0.159	0.073
Germany	18191	8414	19918	13070	36.7%	49.3%	2.987	3.154	1.095	1.553
Denmark,	504	465	1305	1280	51.8%	67.7%	5.000	4.063	2.589	2.753
Norway,	157	429	369	558	54.8%	33.3%	4.291	3.902	2.350	1.301
Spain,	143	1070	264	581	58.0%	20.7%	3.181	2.617	1.846	0.543
Finland,	821	492	2192	555	61.1%	36.4%	4.367	3.101	2.670	1.128
France,	2534	1557	8105	4074	84.5%	65.3%	3.786	4.010	3.199	2.617
United Kindom	1443	2803	4316	5066	73.3%	43.6%	4.083	4.142	2.991	1.807




# 5. Stylized Facts




# 5. Stylized Facts (intertemporal trends)




# 5. Stylized Facts (FFS geographical distribution)



# 5. Stylized Facts (REN geographical distribution)



## 5. Stylized Facts (% of innovation “trading” partners)





## 6. The Model

- N countries,  $j$


- Final output: 
$$Y_j = \left[ Y_{j,c}^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} + Y_{j,d}^{\frac{\varepsilon-1}{\varepsilon}} \right]^{\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}}$$

- For each  $j=c,d$  input: 
$$Y_{j,t} = \left[ \int_0^{A_{j,t}} y_{j,t}^{\frac{\sigma_t-1}{\sigma_t}} ds_t \right]^{\frac{\sigma_t}{\sigma_t-1}}$$

- Technical progress increases number of varieties  $A_{j,t}$
- Monopolistic competition: producing firms each using a specific idea/blueprint. Heterogeneous innovating firms differ along parameter  $a$ , or recipe quality (Pareto)
- Ideas or high quality  $a_H$  are patented, ideas of low quality  $a_L$  are not



# Plot of German renewed patent values on Pareto coordinates



Uncertainty and the size distribution of rewards from innovation  
F. M. Scherer, Dietmar Harhoff and Jörg Kukies  
Evo.lutionary Economics Vol 10



## 6. The Model

First solve the lower nest: optimal demand of  $y_{j,t}$  given  $Y_{j,t}$   
then find optimal levels of  $Y_{j,t}$  given total spending  $M_j$

$$Y_{j,t} = M_j \left( \frac{P_{j,t}}{P_j} \right)^{-\varepsilon}$$

Which allows to find demand for  $y_{i,t}$

$$y_{j,t} = \left( \frac{p_{j,t}}{P_{j,t}} \right)^{-\sigma} M_j \left( \frac{P_{j,t}}{P_j} \right)^{-\varepsilon}$$

Where:

$$P_j = \left( P_{j,d}^{1-\varepsilon} + P_{j,c}^{1-\varepsilon} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$$

$$P_{j,t} = \left[ \int_0^{A_{j,t}} p_{j,t}^{1-\sigma_t} ds_t \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma_t}}$$



## 6. The Model

- Producing one unit of  $y_{j,t}$  costs  $\tau_{ij}c_{j,t}/a_{ij}$

- Firms will price 
$$p_{j,t} = \frac{\tau_{ij}c_{j,t}}{\beta_t a_{ij}}$$

- Profit for each firm in  $j$  will be

$$\Pi_{ij,t}(a) = [1 - \beta_t] \left( \frac{\tau_{ij}c_{j,t}}{\beta a_{ij}} \right)^{1-\sigma_t} M_j P_{j,t}^{\sigma-\varepsilon} P_j^\varepsilon - F_j$$

- Firms will produce if

$$[1 - \beta_t] \left( \frac{\tau_{ij}c_{j,t}}{\beta_t a_{ij}} \right)^{1-\sigma_t} M_j P_{j,t}^{\sigma-\varepsilon} P_j^\varepsilon > F_j$$



## 6. The Model

- Assumption on distribution of  $a$  means that the fraction of country- $i$  ideas with quality higher than  $a_{ij}$  is  $G_{ij}(a) = \bar{a}_{ij}^{-\theta}$
- Moreover,  $\tau_{ij}^\theta = D_{ij}^\gamma e^{-u_{ij}}$

$$G_{ij,t} = \begin{cases} [D_{ij}^{-\gamma}] (F_j)^{-\frac{\theta}{\sigma_t-1}} [c_{j,t}]^{-\theta} [M_j]^{\frac{\theta}{\sigma_t-1}} [P_{j,t}^{\varepsilon-\sigma} P_j^{-\varepsilon}]^{\frac{\theta}{\sigma_t-1}} \left[ \beta(1-\beta)^{\frac{1}{\sigma_t-1}} \right]^\theta e^{u_{ij}} & \text{if } a_{i,t} > \bar{a}_{ij,t} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Which we implement empirically as follows:

$$g_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 d_{ij} + \beta_2 f_j + \beta_3 c_j + \beta_4 m_j + \chi_j + \chi_i + u_{ij}$$

- $\text{Log}(G_{ij})$  is observed only for a subsample: control for sample selection in the transfer relationship (Heckman)



# 7. Empirical Strategy: Distance

## Geographical distance

- Dummy =1 if  $i=j$
- Dummy =1 if contiguous
- Dummy =1 if common language
- Dummy =1 if colonial relationship
- Distance

## Mij

- Market Stock, per capita
- Energy use per capita
- GDP per capita



## 7. Empirical Strategy: Costs and $M_{ij}$

### Fixed costs

- Ginarte and Park Index: 5 years index. Interpolated
- Financial Risk Ratio: monthly by ICRG

### Exclusion restrictions

- Stock of efficiency and renewable policies (sum)
- Knowledge stock in selection equation

$$K_{i,s,t} = PAT_{i,s,t} + (1 - \delta)K_{i,s,t-1}$$

$$K_{i,s,t_0} = \frac{PAT_{i,s,t_0}}{(\bar{g}_{i,s} + \delta)}$$



Outcome Equation						
	Energy Efficient			Renewables		
Same	3.6437*** (0.317)	2.9812*** (0.313)	3.0319*** (0.320)	4.4458*** (0.343)	3.5260*** (0.287)	3.6022*** (0.290)
Distance	-0.0373 (0.055)	-0.1274** (0.065)	-0.1232* (0.065)	0.0918 (0.069)	-0.0565 (0.068)	-0.0469 (0.069)
Colonial Relationship	0.5388*** (0.159)	0.4648*** (0.157)	0.4585*** (0.159)	0.7372*** (0.198)	0.5401*** (0.179)	0.5458*** (0.182)
Contiguous	0.4282*** (0.145)	0.2895* (0.156)	0.2818* (0.157)	0.5626*** (0.163)	0.2781* (0.144)	0.2826** (0.144)
Common Language	0.4684*** (0.126)	0.1758 (0.121)	0.2086* (0.120)	0.6856*** (0.124)	0.3594*** (0.110)	0.3940*** (0.109)
Financial Security (Risk Ratio Index)	0.6166*** (0.123)	0.4142*** (0.122)	0.4553*** (0.144)	0.7226*** (0.152)	0.4122*** (0.154)	0.4602*** (0.165)
Market Stock PC	0.2027*** (0.029)	0.2588*** (0.042)	0.4082*** (0.072)	0.2487*** (0.034)	0.2897*** (0.054)	0.4127*** (0.063)
Consumer Price Index			-0.0210 (0.013)			-0.0381 (0.012)
Selection Equation						
Sending Knowledge Stock Fossil	0.2839*** (0.017)	0.2456*** (0.023)	0.2479*** (0.023)	0.1376*** (0.015)	0.1141*** (0.019)	0.1109*** (0.019)
Sending Knowledge Stock Renewable	-0.0062 (0.017)	0.0697** (0.028)	0.0837*** (0.028)	0.1237*** (0.017)	0.2120*** (0.026)	0.2237*** (0.026)
Ratio Policy Stocks		-0.0339*** (0.010)	-0.0278*** (0.009)		-0.0165** (0.007)	-0.0125* (0.007)
Financial Security (Risk Ratio Index)	0.4858*** (0.087)	-0.0417 (0.119)	0.2920** (0.129)	0.5845*** (0.088)	0.1855 (0.118)	0.4487*** (0.129)
Market Stock PC	0.0881*** (0.012)	0.1832*** (0.019)	0.1970*** (0.018)	0.0746*** (0.010)	0.1326*** (0.012)	0.1401*** (0.012)
Consumer Price Index			-0.0961*** (0.012)			-0.0771*** (0.009)
Observations	41466	20154	19832	42189	20124	19807
Log-Likelihood	-23725	-14862	-14348	-26273	-15900	-15485



## 6. Empirical Results

- Model: identifies the variables affecting the decision of heterogeneous firms to protect blueprints abroad
- Geographical distance hinders patent duplication (TT)
- Financial stability has a positive effect on TT. Now exploring whether this effect is differentiated by country/level of development
- Innovative ability in the sending country associated with higher probability of TT
- Environmental policy is positively correlated with the probability of transfer



## 6. Future Research Avenues

### Short term:

- Better index for environmental policy
- Better index for fixed costs
- Price indexes

### Longer term:

- What drives the Pareto distribution?
- What is the role of IPR and transfer on domestic innovation in developing countries?
- Using trade data to look at the issue of embedded technology transfers





**Thanks**



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